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# West Europe Report

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1 MAY 1986

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST YOUTH ELECT CHAIRMAN--The 23 year-old excavation and concrete worker Ole Jensen was elected chairman by the congress of the Danish Communist Youth last weekend. Ole Jensen was previously chairman of the National Students Organization, LOE [Landsorganisation af Elever]. He has also been editor of the socialist youth newspaper FREMAD. [Text] [Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 1 Apr 86 p 2] /12624

CSO: 3613/97

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# MEMBERSHIP DECLINES IN CDU, RISES IN SPD

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 31 Mar 86 pp 74-77

[Article: "With a Minus Chancellor Toward a Minus Party; First paragraph is SPIEGEL introduction]

[Text] Restiveness at the CDU base: for the first time in a long time, membership in the CDU is shrinking while, after a minus extending over several years, the number of SPD comrades is rising again. There is agreement among the Social and Christian Democrats about the causes of the change in trends--the citizens' disgruntlement about Bonn breakdowns and scandals. CDU strategists are afraid that West Germans are tired of Kohl and that the "atmospheric low" of the CDU will persist.

Before Easter, CDU national manager Peter Radunski had to fulfill an onerous duty. He had to explain to the press why, according to the latest figures, the CDU registered a nationwide loss of almost 12,000 members last year.

Playing the bloodletting down, Radunski cited "superannuation" of the membership as the main reason, saying that in individual months unfortunately up to 1,000 Christian Democrats had died. But at best that was half the truth. The national manager forgot to explain why the rise in membership, which began in the early seventies and steadily caused the party to grow for more than a decade, recently has dropped to such an extent that for the first time deaths and cancellations of membership predominate again, with the result that the CDU of a minus chancellor has become a minus party.

No less serious for the Christian Democrats is the fact that whereas its coalition partner, the FDP, has lost 20 percent of its membership since the start of the new coalition, an opposite trend is beginning in the SPD, with long missed Comrade Trend emerging again.

Having proudly celebrated the accession of its millionth member in September 1976, during the peak period of the SPD-FDP coalition, the SPD lost young and leftist comrades in droves, up to 30,000 a year, during the painfully long late phase of the Schmidt era, when the fight over counterarming and budget reform was raging within the party. By the end of 1982 the Social Democrats had lost almost 100,000 members.

After 3 years of the new coalition government, the SPD is now registering something new in its membership trend. Last year for the first time the number of comrades rose again--by as much as 0.4 percent to 919,457. It appears that the plus of the SPD is caused by the same things as the minus in CDU membership--anger over failures and scandals of the Kohl government.

No doubt the "atmospheric low," which the CDU minister-president in Kiel, Uwe Barschel, identified as the cause of the defeat in the municipal elections in the north, now, after the CDU voters, has also affected the party's own ranks. The "current membership trend," writes the Bonn CDU Information Service (UfD), is marked by "stagnation ranging to a slight reduction."


Looking for the reasons, CDU functionaries, whose party organizations have been affected by the negative trend, have already come up with results. They say that the main damage was done by the breakdowns from Buschhaus to Bitburg, the quarrels about the right to strike and security laws, the investigations of Kohl and others, the unsuccessful TV performances of the chancellor, and the unspeakable "blackout" debate.

Many CDU supporters in the plants are in a very bad mood. "Enough," says even the SOZIALE ORDNUNG, organ of the Christian Democratic Workers (CDA), in reporting the atmosphere at the base. In the plants, the paper notes, the strength of the CDU was "senselessly blown up the chimney" as a result of the article 116 debate. Reserves for the election campaign had been "frittered away," and one had to wonder "with whom Helmut Kohl actually wants to remain chancellor."

Such tones had previously been heard only from party friends in Munich. There Finance Minister Max Streibl has already called on the chancellor to "stand and act rather than sit and smile." CSU Bundestag Deputy Kalus Rose is already sure that in the event of an election defeat in Lower Saxony "we will not be able to win the next Federal election with a chancellor named Kohl." The CSU itself, though often also in opposition within the coalition, has not been spared either by the decrease in membership. Last year the Christian Socialists, spoiled by success, lost a net 1,377 members--an alarm signal for CSU Headquarters.

In the south, it is primarily the rural population which is mad at the Christian Union; in the labor strongholds in the west, the Christian party is fairing worse. Kurt Biedenkopf, chairman of the newly formed North Rhine-Westphalia party organization, is engaging in open criticism saying that many party members on the Rhine and Ruhr are simply "overtaxed" if they have to explain the behavior of the Bonn government to the base.





- Key: 1. Brake on accessions  
 2. Members of People's Parties in the Federal Republic, at the end of each year

By publishing alarming figures from his own party organization, Biedenkopf wants to trigger an internal party debate about the membership minus. After figuring accessions, cancellations, and deaths and cleaning out the files, the North Rhine-Westphalia Christian Democrats last year had to put up with a decrease of 7,629 members--a far greater loss than anywhere else, both absolutely and relatively speaking.

Berlin Christian Democrats trace membership reductions of the local CDU not only to the generally deplored "flops of the Kohl government" but to the local scandals. One part, strategist "cannot remember" ever "having witnessed as many cancellations" as after the construction scandal became known. "That boomerangs on us," admits Berlin CDU Secretary General Klaus-Ruediger Landowsky, "and chokes us."

In Lower Saxony too, where the CDU is spending a lot of money to improve its image in time before the Landtag election in June, CDU functionaries and members are feeling a head wind. In the election campaign, people are fond of omitting the name of Kohl, and CDU politicians breathe easier when "not Kohl but Stoltemberg comes" to election events.

Without the chancellor the CDU may manage 52 percent, says Lower Saxony CDU chief Wilfried Hasselmann, wittily, but "if Helmut Kohl helps us a lot," it probably will be no more than "50 percent." And when visitors to the CDU information booth at Nibelungenplatz in Braunschweig enquire all too persistently about Helmut Kohl, election campaigners such as the CDU's Marga Thomas have been known to come up with the remark that the chancellor was "perhaps not quite himself" at the moment.



Merciless disparagement is Kohl's fate in RUNDBLICK, a press service which sometimes is considered the mouthpiece of Ernst Albrecht's Hannover state chancellery. The Christian Democrats are "tired of Kohl," states a commentary by Albrecht ally Helmut Rieger, with even the most faithful having reached "the end of their tether." Kohl has been "decisive at the wrong times," complains Rieger, and indecisive "where he should be decisive."

If "more" should come out of the investigations by the prosecutors' offices in Mainz and Bonn into perjuries in the party donations affair, says Rieger, a point will be reached where "all of a sudden it will be necessary to take action and action will be taken." Loyalty toward the chancellor was already on the verge "of becoming lack of loyalty toward the party."

The internal party debate about possible changes in course is being made more difficult by the fact that withdrawals from the party are justified by contradictory arguments.

On the one hand, there are staunch rightists for whom the change in coalitions turned out to be far too lax. In the Guetersloh CDU, for example, members canceled their membership because they missed a "more consistent action in regard to article 218," and in southern Germany Christian Democrats left the party because of the "loan of millions to the GDR communists" and the "invitation to Honecker."

On the other hand, members also quit because they could not put up with the stationing of Pershing and cruise missiles and with Kohl's endorsement of Reagan's SDI. In the Neuwied-Engers CDU, for instance, a lawyer couple justified their quitting the party with a 3-page letter about a lack of perspectives "in peace policy" and the "constantly rising armament expenditures."

Many CDU defectors are disgruntled about the "unfortunate performance of the leading politicians" and "affairs such as the Flick affair," according to the local CDU chairman in Neuwied-Engers in Rhineland-Palatinate, as well as about the "unpopular measures in social policy. "

In the opinion of Peter Roedl, CDU chief in Waldeck-Frankenberg in Hesse, economy measures whose effect "the people are realizing only now" have led to "several people quitting the party." In his region too, he says, the negative "performance image" of the Federal government has been "reflected in quite a fulsome way" in membership trends. What with the variety of reasons for quitting, CDU functionaries are not having an easy time trying to come up with a panacea against the reduction in membership. Only the Junge Union [Young CDU], which has been stagnating itself lately, has already come up with a savior.

After Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister-President Lothar Spaeth had spoken in Gifhorn before Lower Saxony's young CDU generation, observers recently noted "applause lasting for minutes on end."

A young delegate thanked the guest from the southwest effusively, saying: "If people like you shape policy, it is not too late [German: spaet] Mr. Spaeth."

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1 May 1986

POLITICAL

FINLAND

## PAPER VIEWS IMPACT OF DECLINING CENTER PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 4 Mar 86 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Party Members and Voters"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] Party membership is starting to decline, according to a survey in HELSINGIN SANOMAT. If so this means that the postwar tendency toward an increasingly organized society has been broken and that we are going over to a more unstructured mass democracy, according to Jan-Magnus Jansson.

In an interesting article a few weeks ago HELSINGIN SANOMAT noted that party membership figures are declining. The newspaper pointed out that only the Swedish People's Party has managed to maintain its membership and even increase it slightly.

This leads to a consideration of the relationship between party membership and voter support, of the role played by members and of structural differences between various parties.

Party membership figures have long been available in various works dealing with political parties or the entire political system in our country. We noted that the general tendency in the figures and the "rank" of the parties correspond to those in the HELSINGIN SANOMAT [HS] survey, even though the exact figures vary a great deal. There is a drastic difference with regard to the Finnish People's Democratic League [DFFF] whose 1978 membership is given as 165,000 in Professor Onni Rantala's book on changes in the party system while the HS figure is 35,887. This is obviously due to different calculation methods, based on the fact that DFFF is an umbrella organization that includes in addition to its "own" members entire organizations, primarily of course the Finnish Communist Party.

The HS writer points out that parties are increasingly transferring their membership files to computers and this eliminates "departed souls" and non-paying members from the files. In spite of this it is obvious that the material is by no means completely reliable. HS consulted Dr Jan Sundberg of Helsinki University for expert advice. He pointed out in particular that curves of party membership trends are not precise, due in part to different

ways of figuring the number of members. Overlapping occurs because those who belong to youth and women's organizations are often party members as well as members of the separate organizations, etc.

Thus although many figures are somewhat inflated, we can assume that they provide an accurate indication of trends. If that is the case there has been a stagnation of membership recruitment in most parties in the 1980's: the curves level off or point downward. But the only dramatic downturn involves the Communist Party and, to a lesser extent, DFFF. If the figures are regarded as generally reliable the tendency is obviously related to the declining interest in the parties in recent years.

However the most important thing is not membership trends over a period of time but the tangible differences between individual parties. It has been generally recognized that the Center Party has long stood out as the most highly organized party in this country both in terms of absolute membership figures and with regard to the ratio of members to the total number of party voters, which is the most significant indication of the degree of organization. By its own account the Center Party has almost 300,000 members, or 45.3 percent of the party's voters in 1983. This is the fruit of Arvo Korsino's labors on behalf of the party in his time.

The Swedish People's Party [SFP] has the second highest degree of organization with almost 55,000 members, or 39.7 percent of the party's voters. SFP is unique in that the organization percentage has risen slightly during the 1980's, corresponding to the generally increased interest in the party.

The Center Party and SFP are both regional parties that strongly dominate certain regions and attract their other supporters from clearly defined groups with the use of easily understood slogans. That is the reason for the high degree of organization.

The urban parties, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, are clearly not as highly organized when measured by these criteria. The Social Democrats list 11.6 percent of their voters as party members and the percentage for the Conservatives is 11.8. It may be best to leave the Communist Party out of these calculations during the present period of upheaval. It is hard to get precise membership figures for the Rural Party, but it is obvious that the percentage of organization is extremely low.

Of course membership figures are not the only measure of strong organization. The activity of members and the solidity of local and district organizations are other characteristics of strong organization. But it is obvious that even members of the parties with a high degree of organization cannot speak on behalf of all the voters.

On the whole, members differ politically from nonmembers who vote for the party. They represent the party's ideology in a particularly deliberate and militant way. Socially, groups that are regarded as being especially central to the party can be overrepresented in its membership. The working class is

underrepresented, at least in the nonsocialist parties, while the position of intellectuals and in some instances farmers is too strong.

Incidentally, with regard to the current question of election reform, it is safe to say that no organizational democracy can guarantee that nominating candidates in "suitable places" through the agency of the party apparatus will lead to priorities that correspond to the preferences of the voters, in the event a transition to so-called long lists is being considered. From that point of view it is best to continue to allow the voters to select the individual candidates they prefer.

Then what good does it do a party to have a lot of members? First and foremost party members form a kind of basic pool that can be counted on to vote for the party in good times and bad. The strong organization of the Center Party is one of the reasons why the party has survived social structural changes so well.

In addition, candidates for various positions of trust on the state and municipal level and sometimes for civil service tasks are recruited from the ranks of the party. On the municipal level in particular, an extensive selection of people to choose from is desirable. On the other hand these tasks help to tie individuals more closely to the party.

The ideas of party members make a big contribution to the shaping of party policy. Party opinion, whether real or imagined, is the sounding-board against which party leaders perform. Party members receive the party's membership paper and the other information sent out by the central office. They are also supposed to attend meetings and express their views. The fact that the opinions of voters outside the local party organization, especially those of so-called marginal voters, are beginning to be increasingly important while the views of party people are declining in importance is a big change that can be regarded as a sign of progress or as a step backward depending on one's point of view. This has increased the power of the mass media and the opinion pollsters enormously.

If party membership really starts declining this would mean a break in the trend during the postwar period toward a steady increase in the power of the organizations. This would mean a shift from an organized society to a more unstructured mass democracy in which momentary impulses have increased significance.

6578

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSES ELECTION RESULTS

PM140925 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Mar 86 pp 2-4

[Martine Bulard report: "Discussion at Central Committee Meeting"]

[Excerpts] At the risk of disappointing commentators, the PCF Central Committee did not meet to close the debate but instead to stimulate the Communists' thinking. For 2 days after Paul Laurent's report, which was published in L'HUMANITE yesterday, the Central Committee members launched a broad, free, serious, and uncompromising discussion. Almost 50 of them spoke, and another 30 who were due to take part in the discussion refrained from doing so since their ideas had already been partly expressed. No question was ignored: What exactly is our analysis of the vote? What is its underlying significance? What are its consequences? How can we face up to it? What obstacles do we have to overcome? Should we adapt to the society operating at several speeds which is being established, abandon the idea of changing it, or, instead, fight it? Should we scale down our ambitions at least for a time? Did we start to implement the 25th congress line during the election campaign? Should we change the party leadership? These are, briefly, the questions which were discussed.

Of course, it is impossible here to give an account of all the speeches in full. The report aims to pick out the broad outlines without excluding the disagreements which were expressed. Everybody stressed the Communists' anxiety and, in some cases, bitterness.

Many voters "voted with sinking hearts," with the intention of dealing with the most urgent matters first. Several speakers gave examples of employees who had called on people to vote communist and then explained on Monday that they had "given in" at the last minute and voted socialist. Some voters undoubtedly believed "the PS' great deception" which was fully explained with Francois Mitterrand's direct intervention in the election campaign. The idea of chaos which it brandished, the fantastic effort to hammer home the idea that the president of the republic could never agree to sit with the right in the cabinet misled people. When we warned people, and said that Francois Mitterrand would call on a right-wing prime minister, on Jacques Chirac, many of our interlocutors honestly thought we were exaggerating. "That is going too far." Many of them are now waking up to reality.

At the same time other voters thought that "Cohabitation was a way of avoiding the arrival of a hard right," as Paul Fromenteil demonstrated. They thought they could at least clip its wings by voting socialist. In many cases, he added, the people we met agreed that they were less well off and responded to our proposals. But many reacted. Thus they said: "Yes, by changing things it would be possible to create jobs, but meanwhile..." they voted socialist.

Felix Damette thought that this explanation of the useful vote does not go far enough. "Our interpretation of the results since 16 March poses problems..." It must be admitted "that the citizens made a logical and coherent choice. It is a sanction. The difficulties were caused by the way in which we fought the campaign and the choices made at the 25th congress." "We yielded the left's ground to the PS," he said. "This defeat for the party heralds further defeats, in the presidential election and in the municipal elections. We are out of step with society. Francois Mitterrand will resign on the left and stand as defender of achievements against the right. The PCF is being liquidated. We must stop talking about "continuing," Felix Damette said, and he called for an extraordinary congress. "We do not have the time."

"We keep coming up against this question of the inevitability of the crisis," Sylviane Ainardi said. "Of course, people always want to find simpler reasons, to reassure themselves. But we must oppose the idea of partial solutions to the crisis. There are none. This is precisely what our 25th congress demonstrated," emphasizing a change in society as the only answer to the capitalist crisis. But Lucien Seve thinks that what we did at the 25th congress did not make it possible to "change course" and he therefore proposed the convening of a national council meeting to assess the situation. Guy Hermier recalled that Paul Laurent's report had tried to examine this question. Marcel Rigout expressed the view that the useful vote is "a fact, not an explanation." Expressing the view that the party leadership has "inconsistent and incoherent attitudes," he thinks that "we will not focus our election campaign strongly enough on the idea that the crisis is not inevitable." A major plan must be produced and we must make people believe that a different policy is possible. "While we must maintain the level of our solutions, we must also ensure that we are understood." "Is the party capable of doing this? I do not think so. I do not think our policy and language are in tune with society."

Claude Poperin expressed the view that we should avoid two dangers--"turning the party into a second social democratic party and not heeding the profound discontent in the party toward the leadership." In his view the party's loss of ground was avoidable. We knew that there is a strong reformist current in the country. The answer had to be the reaffirmation of our class choice for a new society. "We did more to combat the PS than to assert our own identity." "We did not talk about our choice of society. We should have conducted a mass debate on the French brand of socialism." "We should think more about society (the working class, young people, retired people...) he said. "We are no longer in step with society."

In Claude Llabres' view we must find out why "despite the social democratic experiment through which our people have just lived, the PCF is losing ground." According to him we must think about the way in which we are implementing the 25th congress line.

Pierre Juquin, for his part, is not in agreement with what he regards as a "suicidal" attitude. He thinks "that there were no new splits in our electorate on 16 March but that the downward trend continued. We have not hit rock bottom yet." He thinks that "the more society changes, the more ground we lose. The fundamental problem is therefore our relationship with society." He noted "the general disruption" of French society (which is being Americanized and is therefore declining) and expressed the view that neither the PS, which is developing into an American-style "democratic" party, nor the neoliberal right is capable of providing an answer to this situation. Nor is the PCF capable of doing this as it is. He therefore called on "Communists to rise up and revive it," saying that this depends on a better understanding of French society and the drafting of a socialist plan for France. Pierre Juquin, who thinks that the PCF "is not by nature an opposition party" read an extract from an article in L'HUMANITE in 1931 on the necessary freedom of criticism in the party. "We must draw up a realistic response," in order to make people "accept a real left-wing policy." It emphasized individual rights, the new civilization, North-South dialogue.... It explained that "building socialism in a single European country is an empty hope" and proposed a "European path."

After stating that the desire to "save the party" is not the "prerogative of a few people, of those who disagree with our strategy," Gaston Plissonnier stressed that "all the other party members are anxious to do this. They are struggling and will continue to struggle to overcome the difficulties.... Pierre Juquin cannot portray himself as a victim, since everybody is citing him. Most party members have been troubled by his public statements, to put it mildly."

When it came to voting on the resolution, Marcel Rigout stated: "While abstaining in the vote on this document, I would like to say, to avoid any confusion, as I have said on several occasions, that I disapprove of Pierre Juquin's statements outside the party, which violate the organizational principles based on democratic centralism."

/8309

CSO: 3519/152

POLITICAL

FRANCE

MARCHAIS ON ELECTION RESULTS AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING

PM140939 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Mar 86 pp 5-7

[Text of speech by PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais to PCF Central Committee meeting in Paris 25 March: "Explaining Taking Action, Uniting"]

[Text] Comrades, in this speech I would like to dwell on just two of the questions discussed in Paul Laurent's detailed report and which refer back to the basic analyses which we made at the 25th congress. First: What state are our people and our country in after these 5 years of socialist government? Second: On the basis of this situation how can we fight to make progress to overcome the crisis and change society?

The Record of 1981-1986: A General Slide Toward the Right

First the record. It is a very poor one.

At the congress 1 year ago we made a detailed examination of how and why the crisis was worsening in all spheres, and how and why capital's forces want to make it even worse.

"To safeguard their class interests," we demonstrated, "these forces are determined to ruin the great opportunities now being offered for reshaping the whole of society. They are striving to set out country permanently on the course of weakening and decline."

What has happened in the past year confirms this disastrous development in all aspects. We can talk of an unprecedented deterioration in the situation of labor and the country itself. I will not go back over the figures which back up this assessment at this Central Committee meeting: They were given in the report. They show that the employment situation has never been so serious; that, contrary to official statements, the French economy has grown weaker; that social inequalities have grown; and that freedoms, especially freedoms in the enterprise, are under attack.

In the political sphere the record of the past 5 years is quite simply disastrous. After being beaten hollow in 1981, the right has made a strong comeback in 1986. Together with the extreme right, it has 54.5 percent of the votes, as against 44 percent of the votes for parties which claim to be left-wing. It is a long time since there was such an imbalance of forces in the right's favor.



However, although enlightening, these figures alone are not enough to show the scale of the swing to the right which the 16 March vote reflected. Another factor must be taken into account, as everybody here knows: of this 44 percent of left-wing voters, almost 32 percent voted socialist.

#### How the "Useful Vote" Worked

Is this the effect of the "useful vote?" It undoubtedly is. During the June 1985 Central Committee meeting we had stressed that the "PS' essential objective" was to be to "capitalize on the reaction against the right and revive the 'useful vote' for its benefit." On the basis of "the strong trend toward the bipolarization of French political life which the practice of the Fifth Republic institutions inspired," every effort will be made, we demonstrated, "to try to limit the choice offered in 1986 to a choice between the PS and the right, reviving a left-right type of confrontation."

We can never overemphasize the deeply undemocratic nature of these institutions, the dangerous responses they arouse and which characterize election behavior increasingly. The plan is well-known: every 7 years, in the presidential elections, the choice must be reduced to two men; and all following elections must be conducted on the basis of this choice. The PS made full use of this phenomenon, which it was able to accentuate thanks to the president's direct involvement. As Pierre Mauroy explained, "the main architect of the recovery (of the PS) is the president of the republic. He succeeded in...linking the way people voted in the parliamentary election with support for his action, which enabled us to emphasize the useful vote." All party members who took part in the election campaign felt the strength of this trend, which constantly grew as election day drew nearer. The PS itself talks of "3 percent of last-minute voters" which it won through this trickery.

However, once this phenomenon has been noted and the mechanism on which it is based has been explained, we still have to understand how millions of employees, unemployed people, and retired people could believe in the conditions which prevailed in 1986 that the "useful vote" on the left, and the "useful vote" for them, was the socialist vote. Of course, this does not mean that they all approved of the PS' whole policy. Many cast a vote "against" rather than a vote "for": a vote against the right rather than a vote for the PS. This is the very principle of the "useful vote."

They nonetheless gave their votes to a party which--as I have just recalled--increased unemployment and sacrifices; they voted for a party which devoted the months of January and February to fighting us and the trade unions to impose flexible working, which portrayed the generalization of Useful Community Work as one of its major successes, which used the flare-up on the stock exchange and "industrial peace" as election arguments. The PS certainly used the word "left-wing" a great deal. But the meaning it gave to this notion is that of a kind of humanitarian element added to a right-wing policy and right-wing statements. It is on this basis that it rallied people.



Because of this an examination of the balance of forces between right and left alone is not enough to fully understand the difference between 1981 and 1986. In 1981 the PCF had 15 percent of the votes; it was already suffering from "useful voting" for the PS which succeeded in reaping the benefits of a great hope for change; the right was at its lowest level for decades; the extreme right had 0.4 percent of the votes. In 1986 the small extreme left parties and the ecologists have been eroded; the PCF has been further weakened; the PS is growing stronger on the basis of a right-wing policy; the right has won; and the extreme right has almost 10 percent of the votes.

#### The Aspiration to Change Society Has Waned

So, in fact there has been a general swing to the right among the voters; this swing is obviously not just to be seen in the electoral sphere but reflects a profound shift in society. The major situation reflected by these elections is a weakening of the popular forces and progressive ideas, and all the values which make up the left's heritage. Above all, the most essential aspect of the class confrontation we are experiencing has been weakened: the aspiration to change life and to change society.

We have often emphasized this, stressing that it is the main obstacle we are encountering and will continue to encounter: Only a small minority of people understand the real causes of the crisis and know the real solutions to it. We devoted our whole election campaign to trying to clarify this fundamental question, on the basis of the pamphlet "It Is Possible to Overcome This Situation" of which we published 8 million copies, and on the basis of our proposals for employment. If these efforts had not been made we would have lost voters rather than winning them. All the indications are that the experience of the past 5 years helped to further cloud the essential problem of the class content of the crisis in the eyes of millions of workers.

Why?

#### The PS Tried to School People to Give Up the Idea of Changing Society

Paul Laurent's report answers this question, rightly stressing that for the 5 years in which it has had full powers the PS "has not only acted in a negative way but has accompanied this political attitude by a fervent campaign in favor of the ideology of accepting the rules of capitalist society and resignation to the crisis and austerity." In this connection, on the basis of experience we can talk of a real effort to school people to give up the idea of changing society.

Brought to power in 1981 thanks to the left-wing union strategy which enabled them to weaken our party, Francois Mitterrand and the PS were in fact unable to immediately do the opposite of what they had promised. They first had to take account of the great popular hope which had put them in the position of governing the country. There were the reforms of the first year introduced by a government in which we were participating. But, as we stressed at the time, because they were not used to lay the foundations of a new policy, those decisions did not solve any problems.

For instance, because they were not accompanied by a production increase and employment policy, the social measures and the increase in consumption they generated produced additional imbalances in the economy. This led the PS to explain that it had been demonstrated that the increase in purchasing power and in social contributions make the situation worse.

The newly nationalized enterprises were managed like those in the private sector, and the loss of jobs continued. This led the PS to explain that it had been demonstrated that nationalizations were not a good solution.

Workers in enterprises were given new rights, but they remained a dead letter or were used as a means of involving them in the employers' objectives. As the employers' newspaper L'USINE NOUVELLE wrote last week, "The Auroux laws undoubtedly played a role in this surprising acceptance by employees of the current difficulties and the enterprise's needs." It is also worth remembering the debates which took place throughout the country in other spheres, in each establishment concerned on priority areas of education, the Legrand reform, and the research governing body. In each case these debates, in which those concerned took part enthusiastically, led to nothing. This led the PS to explain that this demonstrated that having discussions, allowing people to give their opinions, and participating does not improve things.

#### First Discontent Then Acceptance in the Name of 'Reality'

Throughout this period the socialist government put up a tenacious and often brutal resistance to any proposal for combating the crisis, to any people's struggle--be it for employment, against flexible working, or against Berlusconi--whereas it chose to capitulate each time the reactionary forces spoke out, be it the National Council of French Employers, Hersant, or the advocates of private education. This led the PS to explain that it had been demonstrated that struggling led nowhere, that the right is too strong, and that it is necessary to compromise with it.

This painful lesson which the socialist leaders tried to inflict on our people caused a great deal of disappointment and discontent. For a time it was this unpopularity which prevailed, as was demonstrated by the poor results achieved by the whole left in the 1983 municipal elections and the 1984 European elections. A section of the people's forces concluded, like us, from this experience that it was necessary to unite and take action for a real left-wing policy. But the election result shows that the majority of those men and women who voted for change in 1981 have reached the rather vague conclusion from this experience that the reforms proposed by the left were tried but failed to solve anything; that the change in which they had so fervently believed conflicted with reality and that it must therefore be abandoned in the future. Some of those people, indeed large numbers of them, are disillusioned and abstained. Others voted socialist.

The PS constantly reiterates that it has "learned" a great deal from government and it has moved from a "background in opposition" to a "background in government." Indeed it strove above all to "teach" a section of the people's movement that reality henceforth makes it necessary to abandon all the strong points of the left's character and to move from a left-wing attitude to a right-wing attitude.

#### The Idea of the Inevitability of Capitalist Answers to the Crisis Has Gained Ground

This is particularly true of the rest of the problems facing us: the attitude to the crisis and the solutions to it. From this viewpoint the PS boasts of succeeding in reconciling the French people with enterprises. In fact it further strengthened the identification of the enterprise with profit. It used the French people's experience of a socialist government, explaining that it could not keep its promises, and the experience of the developments which have taken place in the labor world which they have every day in their enterprises to bind employees more closely to the requirements of profit.

The aim was not only to convince them that the crisis was inevitable but that capitalist answers to the crisis were inevitable. That was reflected in efforts to end index-linking of wages and to individualize wages, in flexible working, the search for links between changes in wages and the enterprise's financial results, the promotion of the Variable-Capital Investment Company and other forms of saving whose remuneration depends on financial speculation. The ideas that the criterion for the success of an enterprise is profit achieved by any means at all, that employment and that economic progress presupposes social regression, thus gained ground. The bosses have never been as popular as they are now--all opinion polls show this.

#### The Crisis in Political Life and the System of Values Has Grown Worse

This is the root of the problem, from which everything else stems. As soon as the aspiration to change society wanes, when the domination of the dominant class is less opposed, the dominant ideology has new and major opportunities. The swing to the right which can be seen in election choices and in economic concepts is also to be found in the sphere of ideas, values, and everyday behavior.

This has many profound and worrying consequences. Henceforth, using the words "capitalism" or "class struggle" would amount to using hackneyed language which should be abolished. Thinking about society and the conflicts of interests which exist in it would amount to "ideology." Nothing ought henceforth to hinder the mechanism of selection between the "winners" and "losers" of the social system: profits and wealth are allegedly the just reward for the courage of those who dare to be employers; the achievements of people's struggles are apparently unacceptable privileges which curb economic development; collective action is apparently a handicap to individual success; the trade unions are apparently a handicap to individual success; the trade unions are apparently useless and archaic remnants; charity ought to replace justice.

Of course, this change leads to a considerable deterioration in political life itself. It has repeatedly been said that the French people were bored by the election campaign. How can anybody be surprised by that when it was accepted from the start that there is no choice between two plans for society? In these conditions the political debate takes an increasingly pseudopolitical turn, having no connection with people's concerns and the country's problems. The PS' progress and the right's victory are also the result of this growing depoliticization, of this dramatic reduction in the level of political debate, which is increasingly frequently transformed into a debate on leaders and not on ideas. This is a considerable backward step.

#### The Class Choice of Capital's Forces: A Society Running at Several Different Speeds

As we emphasized during our 25th congress, "Capitalism is also throwing society into a political crisis, a crisis in the system of values." "Capital's forces have concentrated the bulk of political power in the hands of one man. They have strengthened all the bureaucratic and technocratic controls of the state apparatus. They have turned radio and television into tools of the ideological war which they are waging against all progressive ideas. Insularity, blinkered individualism, the rejection of politics, skepticism toward any noble ideal are thus presented as the only values to be respected," we said. These ideas and this behavior have gained even more ground since then.

Of course, all these political, social, and economic developments which have taken place over the past 5 years and which an attempt will obviously be made to continue in the coming period owe nothing to chance. They are the embodiment of a class choice which is shared by the right and the PS, the choice of society which capital's forces have made for our country: that of a society which runs at several different speeds, based on the American model. This society is being established in France.

#### Our Fight in the Coming Period

It is in these conditions that we must act henceforth. This brings me to the second point of this speech: On the basis of this situation, how can we fight to make progress toward solving the crisis and changing society?

Of course, we must start from a lucid assessment of the facts. It is clear that the result we achieved 16 March does not provide the people's movement with the best conditions for counterattacking. We emphasized this at our June Central Committee meeting: "In 1986," we said, "there will be a close relationship between the scale of the demand for a different policy, the ability of this policy to win over other forces to produce a majority, and the expansion of the PCF's influence. To achieve change in France means giving the PCF the means of really influencing the course of events."



We failed to achieve our objective of regaining ground. At the same time--and nobody can make us disregard this fact--capital's forces also failed to achieve their objective--which was to crush us--and to rid our country of any idea of social change.

I would like to recall that at the same Central Committee meeting we also considered the way in which we ought to combat what we had called "the great danger" of our party being "pushed to the fringes" which is hanging over the workers. "Is it by ignoring this fundamental issue," we asked, "by seeking compromise, and by trying to join in the pseudopolitical game played by the PS and the right on the ground chosen by them?" We replied: "In addition to the fact that they take no account of the workers' interests, these tactics would--and I mean this--be suicidal. They would be suicidal quite simply because the strategy followed by the PS and the right leaves no room for a revolutionary party."

Everything now leads us to confirm this analysis. We must take our thinking further, and be clearly aware that the more the PS and the right go ahead with their strategy, the more they will try to accentuate the swing to the right in all the spheres we are observing, and the more we will be dissociated from that trend. This is quite simply because their aim is to perpetuate the capitalist society, accentuating its unfair and inhuman character, whereas our *raison d'etre* is to find a lasting solution to the problems facing us, and to build a different society in our country: a French brand of socialism.

Our Explanations and Actions Will Increasingly Conflict With What the Right and the PS Say and Do

In other words--and we must be fully aware of this--our explanations and actions will increasingly conflict with what they say and do.

For instance, they will increasingly vaunt "winners" and "decisionmakers," the virtues of the law of the jungle and "deregulation." These theories will, of course, be accompanied by "liberal" and "social democratic" variants. But can we imagine for a moment that they will be accompanied by revolutionary variants? A party like ours cannot compromise with this ideology and the decisions it inspires. Quite the reverse, we will have to fight them increasingly, countering them with our proposals for growth and employment, equality in education and training, the right to housing, health care, culture, and dignity.

Similarly they will laud what they call the Western world, will continue to foster the racist concept according to which the capitalist countries are an island of democracy and well-being lost in an ocean of barbarity. We must increasingly take action for peace and disarmament, for international solidarity, and friendship among peoples.

Finally, they will try and set up in France an American-style system of alternation between two dominant parties. This is the avowed aim of the PS which, according to its recent decision, is now "in opposition without concessions" in order to "assert itself as the alternate party." Does this



mean that we should take these statements literally and act as if nothing had happened, as if the power at the highest level in the state was not being shared, as we said it would be, between the socialist president of the republic and the right-wing prime minister he has chosen? And, on a more fundamental level, should we act as if this institutional cohabitation did not stem from a political and ideological cohabitation between the right and the PS, both accepting society's capitalist structures and operating rules. Despite petty political statements, opposition to the policy of austerity and unemployment which results from this choice they have jointly made rests with the PCF. We will demonstrate this in action. We will do so by struggling relentlessly against this policy. And we will do so by constantly explaining that we are not resigned to this situation; that a different policy which enables the people's problems to be solved, is possible; and that we are and always will be available to implement this policy with other political forces.

#### Explaining the Content of Our Plan for Society Ever More Widely and Effectively

Faced with the increasingly crisis-ridden society which is being established, we must therefore explain the content of the plan for society which we jointly redefined at the 25th congress ever more widely and effectively. Of course, we must not do so in a doctrinaire fashion. At the congress we emphasized the fact that "We see the French brand of socialism as the practical answer to the problems and needs of our crisis-ridden French society. This society is not immutable; we must know it more fully, understand it better, and develop the answer we are proposing to ensure that it corresponds fully to changes in life. Moreover, socialism will be our people's creation; there can be no question of providing a ready-made plan in advance for what will gradually be built through struggle." In this respect the way in which we conducted this election campaign with the specific and limited proposals we put forward, strikes me as a good illustration of our approach which is based on life and not on vague ideas.

#### Never Losing Sight of the Main Obstacle We Are Encountering

We must therefore continue to assert and make known the answers to our country's serious problems which form the main lines of the socialist society we are proposing: a just society, new growth, a new era for freedom and democracy, a cultural renaissance and the establishment of new human relations. We will not follow the negative forces which constantly state that giving priority to employment, social justice, self-management, the struggle against social segregation in schools, social security, the right to health care for all, feminism, antiracism, international solidarity, peace, and disarmament are all archaic themes. We must therefore fight, as we are doing, on each of these fronts.

At the same time nothing can make us lose sight of what I called just now the major obstacle we are encountering: ignorance of the class content of the crisis and of the necessarily anticapitalist solutions it requires. We could, if necessary, talk at length about the need for a new society and civilization freed from a tendency to Americanization, while calling for a reduction in the level of our economic proposals in the name of "realism."

We settled that debate at the 25th congress: "There are no partial solutions possible," we said, "between those which are aimed at adaptation to the crisis and those which really combat it, calling into question capitalist management choices." We are not making an arbitrary decision to place on this level the solutions we are putting forward: It is the nature of the crisis which requires this. As we showed in this election campaign this obviously does not mean that we should call on people to give a verdict on all our anticrisis objectives at every minute of every struggle.

All this shows us, therefore, that we are going to be forced to increasingly run counter to the trend which capital's forces are trying to impose on society. However, the question we must ask is this: Does this mean we are and will be running counter to the people's needs, concerns, and hopes? The answer is, obviously, no.

#### Our Advantages

As Paul Laurent stressed, we began to "approach politics differently" in this election campaign. In other words we began to patiently and carefully hold out our hands to all those men and women who are victims of the crisis and whom we want to unite. As the Politburo stressed on the evening of 16 March, "these many efforts enabled the Communists to establish new links with millions of people who had moved away from our party." It is impossible to just sweep away this work, which is a considerable achievement, at one stroke.

It is thanks to this remarkable action by the Communists and friends of our party that we won over 2.74 million voters in the parliamentary elections, and 2.87 million in the regional elections, in other words 480,000 and 610,000 more than in the 1984 European elections. We must continue to follow this course. The different reports reaching us show--is this any surprise?--that it is those men, women, and young people who are the most politically aware and more active in the trade union movement, and in associations that we have won over or won back. This is a precious advantage for the future and shows the opportunities which our congress policy gives us.

Of course, we must not take a didactic attitude, the intolerable attitude of those who are always right, toward those men and women who abstained or voted socialist. But we must simply continue to explain our ideas and our analysis to them, and show them that we are still available, with the resources we now have, to struggle and take action with them to solve the problems they face.

To learn all we can from these elections and successfully accomplish the tasks awaiting us, the Communists need to make a great effort in analysis and discussion to fully absorb the 25th congress policy. This effort must be made by all, especially leaders at all levels, to enable them to give our party cells and members the help they are entitled to expect from us.

We Can Convince Millions of People That There Is a Way Out

Comrades,

Our people are faced with a crucial question: What is the permanent solution to the crisis? We replied: changing society, and a French brand of socialism.

Of course, we have used the recent period to make our answers known. But things will increasingly be presented in practical terms. A society which operates at several different speeds is already being set up. This is being done in a [word indistinct] and permanent way.

Not being passive, fighting, putting up opposition therefore presupposes that we convince people and win over millions of people to the idea that this outlook is not inevitable, that we can find a solution, that there is a way out. This is not an easy task: We already know this. But there is no other way for those who want our party to play its role fully and grow stronger in our people's service.

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

## ANALYSES, COMMENTS ON MARCH COMMUNITY ELECTIONS

### Commentator on Campaign

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 20 Mar 86 p 9

[Article by J. M. Bik: "Caution Dominates Hard Campaign"]

[Text] As always, all the politicians questioned last night were pleased with the results registered by their party in the elections. Whether they won or lost did not appear to matter much to anyone in this respect. It is possible, as some people did on behalf of the CDA or the VVD, to compare one's own results with previous unfavorable opinion polls and ascertain that things are back on track. There are many unseated council members who probably listened to these statements with mixed feelings. It is also possible, as the PVDA did, to take the comparable previous election results as a gauge of satisfaction. Many newly-elected council members will wholeheartedly agree with this. Only the voter will from time to time wonder with surprise whether he actually allowed everyone to win.

And yet, this time the local politicians, certainly those of the three big parties, were all to a certain extent right, in their own way. The PVDA is indisputably the winner. After all, it has recovered formidably, in part at the expense of the small leftist parties, from the blow that it received in 1982 during the council elections, even if it was slightly disappointed by a vote percentage of 32 percent after polling results that have for some time been higher. After a couple of years of difficult governing, the CDA ended up with a score that, according to Lubbers and his supporters, more or less reflects the natural party range: one-third of the electorate. And on behalf of the VVD, parliamentary caucus leader Nijpels, who for the last few difficult months has been equally plagued by local politics and opinion polls, was evidently not dissatisfied with what Lubbers sees as the "normal" range of the VVD: around 20 percent (yesterday it was close to 18 percent) of the votes, or something like 30 seats in parliament. The blow visibly exceeded Nijpel's expectations yesterday evening; in the course of the evening, he revised, presumably for tactical reasons, his initially quite cheerful comments.

The inhabitants of the southern provinces can count on the full attention of the three big parties in the parliamentary election campaign. The PVDA did



quite well there in 1977 among voters who formerly supported sectarian parties. Then, just as yesterday evening, PVDA leader Den Uyl talked about places where his victorious party had previously only been "tolerated." In 1982, the stay-at-home vote scored highest, and Nijpels' VVD came out ahead. In short, if there is anywhere where it is worth the effort to bring out voters, it is there. Thus, over the next 8 weeks, more than the average number of northern Dutch politicians will be found at southern Dutch marksman tournaments and music competitions. This is a certainty.

#### Greater Turnout

The results of the council elections give the three big parties hope that their goals for 21 May are not impossible. The PVDA can then derive benefit from the generally larger turnout for parliamentary elections. In addition, it will hope that the government parties will have developed by then a policy that is just damaging enough for them to forfeit yesterday's narrow majority. Only in this does the largest government party see a chance for forcing the CDA into a different coalition.

Final discussion of issues such as media policy, euthanasia and the equal treatment act have been postponed until after the elections. The issue of the stationing of cruise missiles is for the time being all but closed as far as the Netherlands is concerned; it has become less important electorally and can scarcely be used by the PVDA without even greater risks for the period after the elections.

Now that a shift in a few seats in Parliament on 21 May between the two rival blocs (CDA/VVD versus PVDA) can be decisive, the campaign could immediately focus on the revision of the social security system planned by the Lubbers cabinet, and the way in which the nation is to compensate for the disappointing natural gas profits for 1987 (and in particular, by whom, and in what proportions by the citizenry, business and the collective sector). Shortly before elections, the CDA has reason to fear the first question (for its "social face") with respect to how strong Lubbers' position as lead candidate and prime minister can be allowed to be. The VVD can expect little good from the second question with respect to whether it is going to block a tax increase for business (as well) and citizens or accept it reluctantly.

It would not be surprising if the CDA and the VVD were to be very cautious here and perhaps postpone definitive decisions on both issues until after 21 May. In this way, a new Parliament would get the last word, perhaps while the CDA is able to calmly appraise and compare the obligingness of the candidate coalition partners during the cabinet formation. A hard campaign lies ahead, but it will probably be conducted imperceptibly cautiously, on tiptoes.

#### Editorial on Results

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 20 Mar 86 p 9

[Text] Many hundreds of council seats are changing hands as a result of yesterday's elections. They were local elections, but they were very much dominated by national politics. The PVDA, favored by a reasonably good



turnout and the preference of many new foreign voters, achieved a particularly large gain of eight percent compared to its disastrous showing in the council elections of June 1982. It was able to win spectacularly in a number of large southern communities in particular. In the meantime, its victory there and elsewhere is probably more due to its thriving role as the national opposition than to its traditionally large contribution to local government. The frequently cooperating small leftist parties had to pay part of the price for this. Assuming that national influence was considerable yesterday, this provides the "big Left" with an attractive--because it is steadfast--perspective for the parliamentary elections on 21 May, while the "small Left" is left with a proportionately unattractive prospect.

And yet the question is--in part because of this--whether the PVDA can be truly satisfied with yesterday's outcome after its long heyday in the opinion polls. This time it scored, estimating conservatively, the equivalent of 53 seats in the Second Chamber. And the VVD, not unexpectedly, lost approximately four percent compared to its very good results in June 1982, while the CDA as well was forced to give up around one percent. But in terms of the parliamentary elections of September 1982, the government coalition was able to limit the damage to a balanced loss of about four seats (CDA 49, VVD 28). In other words, looking at the figures at the end of the election return marathon last night, one thought first of all about June 1982 and then about the results of the 1977 parliamentary elections (PVDA 53, CDA 49 and VVD 28). On balance, the political baselines thus do not appear to be changed significantly; if the CDA has "turned to the right" since 1977, then apparently so has the electorate.

But even if the baselines have not changed, small shifts of only a few seats could soon (on 21 May) be of great importance. Would the Lubbers cabinet, would the CDA, which is vulnerable in this area, want to continue under these circumstances with the planned revision of social security, for example, in the short run? It sounded strange after last week, but in view of the narrow margins, it was in fact no wonder that practically all leading politicians said yesterday that the parliamentary election campaign should now really begin with full intensity. There is one important difference with 1977: the CDA and the VVD are now asking for support in order to continue to govern together.

The small sectarian parties on the right also appeared to be reliably stable yesterday, while the ideas of the Center Party and its split-offs appeared to have disappointingly little appeal. This should be noted, certainly now that large groups of migrants have for the first time taken part in council elections. If on a subsequent occasion these migrants are viewed by politicians and the media as something more than "ordinary" voters (with their own desires), then something will be won. Because in recent weeks, and yesterday as well, this local migrant suffrage has at times been strongly seized upon as a token of resolute "do-gooding" and national enlightenment.

There was no clear answer yesterday to the question of whether D'66 is experiencing a rebirth under Van Mierlo. At four percent, the Democrats are maintaining roughly the same number of council members that they won in 1982. That is certainly a step forward compared to later unfavorable opinion poll

figures, but still not as big a step as Van Mierlo had and has in mind. Now that the three big parties appear to be united in their plan to give D'66 as little as possible of the publicity on which this party is so dependent, Van Mierlo is facing a very difficult task. All the more so since its campaign position--preferably no cooperation with the CDA/VVD, but actually not with the PVDA either as long as it maintains its position on the cruise missiles--does not make things any easier for the voter.

And finally, it was inevitable, but at the same time it was not good that all those local politicians were forced in recent weeks to conduct their campaigns so much in the realization that the actions taken by Den Uyl, Lubbers, Nijpels and other national heavyweights were more important than whatever local issues there were. In this respect, municipal independence and the independent significance of municipal politics were put to the test in an unusually severe way.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

PCE'S CURIEL ASSESSES REFERENDUM OUTCOME

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 24 March 86 pp 19-21

[Interview with Enrique Curiel, deputy secretary of the PCE, by Nativel Preciado; date and place not given]

[Text] Enrique Curiel is the communist who has fought hardest for a rejection of NATO. Two long efforts ended in defeat. What remains for him is the so-called moral victory, and a bittersweet taste. He is a loser for whom new prospects are opening up. Having become deputy secretary of the PCE as a result of the events of May 1968, he discovered politics along with Enrique Tierno, joined the PCE under the spell of Carrillo, and is today the right-hand man of Gerardo Iglesias. He is confident that the New Left will win back its old splendor.

[Question] Has the feeling of displeasure passed?

[Answer] Obviously we lost the referendum, but it cannot be said that the government won it, either. The truth is we did not feel much displeasure. What remains for us is a certain bittersweet taste.

[Question] You do not then feel defeated?

[Answer] The fact is politics does not involve just numbers. In this referendum, the results might have been the same, but the other way around.

[Question] This could be said about any election.

[Answer] About any, no. Let me explain. In the last 5 days of the campaign, about 2 million Spaniards changed their position, because they received mixed messages from the government. One was directed to the center right. Felipe Gonzalez told the people that if they voted no, we would abandon NATO. The other message was addressed to the most sensitive left wing. "If this government resigns, a Fraga government will replace it." And obviously, the people were frightened.

[Question] Do you believe that Fraga is frightening?

[Answer] Unquestionably, because as many socialist militants have told me, they do not know which is worse--staying in NATO or having Fraga in the government. We lost in the last 72 hours, when the government decided to make the referendum into a process of endorsement of Felipe Gonzalez.

[Question] It is a fact, to judge from the results, that the government waged a more efficient campaign than you did.

[Answer] It is not a question of better or more intelligent. It was more effective only because it had the advantage of television, Radio Nacional, SER and some press organs controlled by the government. With such assets, it is easy to be more effective. Look--the government says that it will not profit from the success of the referendum, not because it is making any generous concession, but because it really cannot. Since 12 March, this government has not represented the Spanish left wing. A split has occurred and the social bloc responsible for the triumph of the PSOE in October of 1982 no longer supports it. It is no accident that Felipe Gonzalez wants to extend a hand to those who voted "no". He is doing so because he realizes that a very important part of his electorate has been lost.

[Question] Do you believe that the 7 million people who voted "no" are against the government and represent the left wing?

[Answer] Absolutely not. It had not occurred to me to make such a stupid analysis. I have never said that the 7 million voters are ours. Similarly, many of those who voted "yes" will not vote for Felipe Gonzalez in the next elections. What I am saying is that now nothing will be as it was before. This referendum dealt a tremendous political blow to Spanish society and has provoked a great debate on the left.

[Question] Do you feel hurt?

[Answer] I do feel hurt, but very hopeful, because we have launched a new political process in Spain. We have socially and culturally regrouped the bloc which waged the battle for change, which was the spearhead in transition and the base for this democracy. With the negative vote, a new generation of young people, intellectuals and the middle classes, to whom the concept of neutrality seems possible and desirable, has erupted in Spain.

[Question] The second phase of the "NATO no, bases out" campaign has now begun. The NATO issue will not change. What will happen concerning the bases?

[Answer] Nothing is finished here. Many things are just beginning now. The U.S. Department of State, the NATO general headquarters in Brussels and the Moncloa Palace should not be unaware that neutrality has tremendous social and cultural support in Spain. The 7 million votes, although not all of these people are leftists, are having an effect on Spanish foreign policy. If Felipe Gonzalez wants to seek a consensus with the pro-Atlantic right wing which Fraga represents, he must know that he is opposing a large proportion of the Spanish people. Now we are asking Felipe Gonzalez to act on the "yes" vote.

[Question] And what does this mean?

[Answer] It means that we will use his own discourse. The government said that the "yes" represented Europe and the "no" represented defense of the bilateral treaty with the United States. Well then, as Europe won, let them denounce the bilateral treaty, that is to say, "bases out."

[Question] Your slogan says "bases out by spring."

[Answer] It is in the spring that we will launch the campaign asking for cancellation of the bilateral agreement with the United States which expires in April of 1987, because this is the only way we can avoid being "nuclearized."

[Question] Do we not already have a guarantee that there will be no nuclear weapons on our territory, following this referendum?

[Answer] I think not. The current agreement with the United States provides for the possibility of installing nuclear weapons with the permission of the Spanish government. That is what the protocol Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Moran signed says, so that a decision of this type does not need to be approved by the Parliament.

[Question] They are now talking of a reduction in American troops.

[Answer] Let them not come to us with the assurance that 3 or 4 thousand U.S. soldiers will leave. The problem does not lie with the number of troops, but the quality. Matters will not be resolved by reducing the number of soldiers, by closing down the bases.

[Question] You say that the PSOE has been affected by this referendum. The view in the streets, however, is that we will have a socialist government for a good number of years.

[Answer] That depends on a number of factors. We will see how long Felipe Gonzalez will be able to sustain Fraga, who is his political crutch. The plans of Suarez, whether or not he will decide to head a progressive center, represent another unknown factor. And finally, there is the question of whether we on the left will be capable of converting this movement which has developed around the "no" vote on NATO into political energy.

[Question] Will you be able to do so?

[Answer] That is what I hope. A great deal of wisdom and clarity is needed to achieve this leadership. In any case, I do not see Felipe Gonzalez governing from now until 1990.

[Question] What does that mean?

[Answer] It means that in NATO, with Calvino, with Barrionuevo, with 3 million unemployed, with the bankers extending a hand to them ... there are some kinds



of help which are deadly. The truth is that I do not want to probe wounds, but I feel obliged to note that something will have to happen within the PSOE, with the Socialist Left and the UGT. I am simply awaiting the decision of the PSOE with regard to the socialist ideology. I note that those in the Moncloa Palace are very concerned.

[Question] I see that you omit any mention of the meteoric rise on the stock exchange, the congratulations from a number of governments, the relaxation of the economic authorities ...

[Answer] Those in power are content with the results of the referendum. The matter of the stock market is no mystery. The government contrived a strategy in the final days of the campaign so that there would be a drop on the stock market and thus the undecided would be frightened. The bankers, at the urging of the Bank of Spain and the Foreign Bank, have manipulated the stock market to suit their purposes. The highest authorities are supporting the government, which for a supposedly socialist government, may prove counterproductive.

[Question] There may be terrible points of coincidence. Alfonso Guerra says that he was sorry to see honorable pacifists voting on the 12th with the Herri Batasuna and El Alcazar.

[Answer] Many stupid things have been said. We are satisfied because at least we did not lose the papers as did the government. It is surprising, for example, that Fernandez Ordonez said that this was the "no" vote of the fascists, because when many of us were in Carabanchel, Ordonez headed the INI under the Franco government.

[Question] Electoral campaigns are full of base actions. Those who fail to fulfill their electoral promises should be penalized.

[Answer] Of course. This campaign has been a kind of melodrama. Felipe Gonzalez shows a dangerous dictatorial symptom, confusing the party with the state and with civil society. He will have to read some treatises on political sociology in order to avoid falling into such errors.

[Question] I was not speaking only of the electoral lies of the government, but those of all politicians.

[Answer] In this instance, we have not sunk to any base actions. At least we have not victimized anyone in the regrettable way Felipe Gonzalez did, certainly on the advice of Julio Feo, who knows that squeezing destitute young people between the left and the right is a political marketing technique which always produces good results. At his dinners at the Bodeguilla, Felipe Gonzalez has reiterated an obsessive phrase, it is said. "They are coming for me, they are coming for me."

[Question] I insist that not only the government should be penalized.

[Answer] I agree. There is no political tradition here, and for this reason deceitful messages prevail. Society is easily influenced. Here television

commands. The level of a political leader's legitimacy depends on his appearances on television.

[Question] And can we not defend ourselves against this?

[Answer] Society has few mechanisms for defending itself against politicians and overlooks their lies with frightening ease. Therefore, leaders like Felipe Gonzalez, who is an excellent communicator, with Andalusian wit, representing the image of youthful Spain, sell themselves so well. The only defense is the organization of civil society.

[Question] The unknown quantity is whether the traditional left will be able to take advantage of this new political panorama.

[Answer] We have already made an offer. The campaign against NATO has served at least to get the PCE to establish an electoral platform for 1986.

[Question] This would have been possible when the PCE enjoyed its greatest splendor, that is to say when Suarez was in the Moncloa Palace.

[Answer] With that PCE, Felipe Gonzalez would not even have dared to call for a referendum. In any case, although we are not enjoying our best political period, I am certain that we will transform ourselves into a good political alternative to the PSOE, and we will not allow a vacuum to be created to the left of this government. We can count on many independents. Just now we are observing the second anniversary of the Executive Board for the Referendum, in which a broad spectrum of political forces participated.

[Question] I am afraid that the New Left (ecologists, pacifists, antinuclear forces, anarchists) does not want to hear about the PCE.

[Answer] We are not thinking of that movement. I sincerely believe that the most reasonable thing is that it is better for the PCE to occupy the "negative vote" area than for other more recently emerging forces to do so. Very diverse forces with only a single common denominator--acceptance of the constitution--are included in the platform we are proposing. We will have a very brief electoral program, with only four or five major themes, so that they can be taken up by everyone.

[Question] Are you forgetting the unity of the communists? Do you no longer want to know anything about Carrillo and Gallego?

[Answer] We want unity, but new political prospects which extend much farther have opened up. Let us say that the problem of unity concerns us, but does not worry us. Both Carrillo and Gallego have disappeared with the tide of the referendum. And I will tell you the truth: Things are much easier with Gallego than with Carrillo.

[Question] Why do you have such difficulty with Carrillo, despite the fact that you were his shadow for so long?

[Answer] I do not get along badly with Santiago. In fact, I joined the PCP after reading his books. I spent 5 years working with him, and the little of politics I know I learned there at his side. I would be a base ingrate if I did not acknowledge what I owe to him. No, I am not Carrillo's enemy, but everything he has done since the arrival of Gerardo Iglasias in the secretariat general lacks justification. If Carrillo returns to the PCP we will have to go, group by group, persuading the militants to accept him again.

[Question] Do you regard this as a lost cause?

[Answer] No, but this would be a difficult thing. Some groups have told us that "if Carrillo comes in this door, more than one of us will go out the other."

[Question] That seems impossible.

[Answer] Well, that is how it is. Not even he realizes how far his political obfuscation has gone. I trust that he may regain lucidity one day.

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MILITARY

AUSTRIA

FRISCHENSCHLAGER DEFENDS PURCHASE, EMPLOYMENT OF DRAKENS

Vienna PROFIL in German 17 Mar 86 pp 27-28

[Interview with Defense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager by Otmar Lahodynsky, date and place not given: "Accidents Will Happen"]

[Text] [Question] 244,000 citizens of Styria have signed a petition protesting against the Draken. The supporters of the initiative are now calling for your resignation and cancellation of the contract. Do you feel that this has hurt you politically ?

[Answer] I don't feel that this has hurt me at all and I see no objective reason for resigning. Quite the contrary: the fact that the Styrian OeVP as well as OeVP general secretary Graff are calling for my resignation shows that these moves are politically motivated for the most part. I view their call for my resignation as an OeVP knee-jerk reaction. But I am somewhat surprised just the same, since this same OeVP kept calling on my predecessor to resign because he failed to make any aircraft purchases. And what makes me angry is that the OeVP is now backing away from a decision in which it participated.

[Question] Nonetheless, SPOe Lieutenant Governor Hans Gross has also accused you of having been less than skillful in handling the matter, pointing out that the Draken opponents are being given additional ammunition in view of the fact that some pilots are undergoing psychological tests.

[Answer] I cannot let a popular initiative deadline determine whether pilots are tested or not. I neither ordered these examinations to be made, nor terminated. These are tests to insure flight safety. They have unjustly been likened to "East Bloc methods and forcible psychiatric examinations."

[Question] But it was strange that of the three pilots undergoing Draken training in Sweden only those two were subjected to psychological tests against their will who had come out with financial demands and had criticized the aircraft.

[Answer] The way you put it there are some physicians who manipulate medical examinations for political reasons. That is such a gross accusation that I will ask the medical association to comment on this issue.

[Question] Weren't the experts mistaken because the pilots were fit for duty just a week later ?

[Answer] The flight safety officer is required to submit an immediate report in case a pilot appears to constitute a danger to flight safety. In such an event, the pilots must be examined by flight medicine experts who may call on medical specialists, if needed. In this particular instance, the two pilots were examined in the interest of flight safety. They were not declared unfit to fly, however, but were grounded for the duration of the examinations.

[Question] Josef Krainer, the governor of Styria, virtually called you a psychiatric case when he said that your position is "totally removed from reality." He has called on you to cancel the purchase contract. Can 240,000 Styrians still intercept the Draken ?

[Answer] The governor of Styria, who is constantly complaining about a lack of style and unwillingness to thrash things out, has leveled personal attacks on me on a number of occasions. It is possible, of course, to manipulate the facts with the help of a huge propaganda effort and then to accuse the one who comes out against these distortions of being removed from reality.

[Question] The charge being made is that the Draken is too expensive, too old, too noisy and harmful to the environment. Now if all of these charges are false, why hasn't a single one of these Swedish bombers ever landed at Zeltweg so as to convince the public otherwise ?

[Answer] Saab cannot make a Draken available to us and according to Swedish regulations a regular air force plane of theirs may not be flown to a foreign country. But I will continue to make an effort in this direction.

[Question] But a few years ago an entire squadron of Saab 105s flew to Graz for a friendship visit.

[Answer] Those were not regular air force planes. Besides, what good would such a demonstration do ? It would be an air show pure and simple. I have seen the Draken. Of course it is noisy--just like any other aircraft. But the interesting thing is that the Draken is no noisier than the "flying barrels" we had here in Austria for years.



[Question] Let me put it more plainly: Acting as a representative of the republic, you bought a 24 year-old used car and the test drive did not take place until after you did buy it. Switzerland is just now going through the decision-making process on the purchase of 24 jet trainers. The models under the most serious consideration are tested by the Swiss air force for an entire year. Only after these tests are completed will a final decision be made. In our case it appears that it was the other way around.

[Answer] Our pilots have known the Draken for many years.

[Question] ...because the first Draken offer was made as long ago as 1968.

[Answer] Yes. At that time, they were very, very new aircraft. Why we bought 40 Saab 105 trainers and did not buy half that number of Drakens at the time has not really been cleared up to this day. The thing that really riles me is that people are now acting as though I had bought 24 aircraft at some flea market. My experts have flown the Drakens many times over the past 20 years and have tested them. Now they will undergo a general overhaul in Sweden and only then will be individually tested and approved by our experts.

[Question] But doesn't it seem odd that Austria is purchasing an aircraft in 1986 which was manufactured between 1963 and 1965? The Danes have just started to replace their 43 Drakens with more modern aircraft as part of a modernization program that is to be completed in 1993.

[Answer] The Danes will also be flying the Drakens until the late nineties. Our experts have convincingly assured me that the Swedish aircraft do meet our demands and are capable of fulfilling all of our needs.

[Question] Based on the most recent data, the Draken does not use 3,300 liters of fuel per hour of flying time as was originally reported but 5,800 liters which is about as much as an Austrian Airlines DC-9.

[Answer] As a rule, these contentions are wrong.

[Question] These "wrong" figures were reported by those first three pilots of ours who trained on the Draken. This December 1985 memorandum of conversation also contains an item which might be of interest to those living close to Graz and Zeltweg: "In any event, Saab 35 must fly at an altitude of 500 meters above threshold when starting descent about 20 kilometers from threshold point."

[Answer] These were impressions gathered by the pilots during the initial training phase. They are under orders to record their impressions on a continuing basis. The approach pattern is not 20 kilometers long.

That is simply wrong. The normal angle of approach for the Draken is between three and five degrees; but technically a steeper approach is possible. Let me say this regarding fuel consumption: The Swedes have signed a contract based on the invitation to bid. We will now check out all the figures to see which of them are correct and which are not.

[Question] The initiative also takes note of a strange price rise for the Draken. In 1983, Saab sent a telex to Consul Drescher, your representative, offering 24 Drakens at 6.5 million Swedish crowns per system which is equal to 1.5 billion schillings. One year later, these same aircraft suddenly jumped in price to 2.4 billion schillings. How do you explain this difference in price ?

[Answer] If you look at that so-called offer, which consists of a few lines of telex text, and then at our actual voluminous sales contract, you will readily see that this is like comparing apples and oranges. For that matter, that basic offer never actually reached my ministry.

[Question] Just the same, it did appear in the 1983 status report of your air section.

[Answer] We did not buy these aircraft until we had a detailed performance report in hand. One cannot compare a telegram sent out by a firm within its own jurisdiction with a detailed bid.

[Question] According to the sales contract, the technical "publication" alone comes to 186 million schillings and for a "publications index," a kind of catalog, the Swedes are charging us a whopping 2.5 million schillings. Doesn't that look as though the Swedes are taking us for a ride ?

[Answer] The 186 million schillings were in payment for the complete documentation, including all the know-how regarding the system. I have been told that this sum of money is quite appropriate. To think that our experts who negotiated the contract were so simple-minded that they spent 186 million schillings for something they could just as easily have bought in any bookstore is just plain wrong.

[Question] The British, after all, charged only half as much for this publication.

[Answer] Rest assured that my experts looked at every item very carefully.

[Question] Why was the purchase decided on so hastily ? You yourself said that time was of the essence because our Saab 105s were "old and rickety" and had to be replaced for that reason. But in the meantime it has turned out that these planes are not being replaced at all but that they will continue to fly until the year 2000.

[Answer] Yes, as trainers but not as surveillance planes. Only 16 of them will be flying for far fewer hours than heretofore. I am really sick and tired of answering the same old questions which have long since been settled.

[Question] Just the same, Chancellor Sinowatz, too, told his party confidants that the Saab 105s should be replaced by the Drakens.

[Answer] Yes. Up to now we have been using a training plane for purposes for which it was not designed. It is as if someone used a VW Bug for years to cart rubble and was now buying a truck because the Bug was no longer up to the job. Well, now we are not going to junk those 30 VW's but will use them to train our pilots to drive that truck.

[Question] But we are buying a truck that is even older than the VW Bug.

[Answer] We are perfectly aware of what we are doing. We are making use of a technology we can handle and which is going to fulfill its purpose until the year 2000 in the air forces of three nations.

[Question] First it was Lt. Col. Georg Schmidt who quit the service in protest against the Draken decision. Now another officer has thrown in the towel: Lt. Col. Hermann Klug, an aviation specialist, has declined any further assignment to the LEFM department, citing the lack of competent personnel. In a letter to his superiors, he said that even "minor problems affecting present operational units confront the existing organization with almost insoluble difficulties."

[Answer] Col. Schmidt was responsible for area aircraft. His position was not as important as he now makes it appear.

[Question] Just the same, he was responsible for the aeronautical infrastructure of all of our aircraft.

[Answer] He left the service as an avowed supporter of American planes. I am not familiar with the second case; but the procurement of a new system after decades of neglect of course is a project that creates major problems. But the first of the aircraft will not get here until the fall of 1987. Until then, the pilots and the technical personnel will be in training. None of these things present us with insurmountable difficulties.

[Question] Just recently another Swedish Draken plunged into the sea. Aren't you afraid that crashes of this sort might take place in Austria as well? What sort of a crash quotient would cause you to take the consequences as a cabinet member and admit that the Draken purchase was a flawed decision?

[Answer] The fact that accidents can happen in aviation has no bearing on the decision to engage in air space surveillance. Under these circumstances I cannot offer a guarantee that no Draken will ever crash on Austrian soil. But the most recent crash illustrates the entire safety issue extremely well. The Draken crashed because the Swedes were using it for a different purpose than we. They were using it as a low-level, ground support attack aircraft and so on. The causes of accidents are almost never technical but rather the result of such daredevil maneuvers.

[Question] Of the 600 Drakens produced thus far 123 have crashed.

[Answer] My experts have looked into every one of the Draken accidents. The reason for them is the specific type of training programs conducted by the Swedish air force. The Finns, who are using the Draken for surveillance as we are, have not had a single total failure yet.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# CRITICAL STUDY OF CIVIL DEFENSE EFFORT REVIEWED

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT in German 22 Mar 86 p 12

[Review by Wilfried von Bredow of book "Zivile Verteidigung im Rahmen der Gesamtverteidigung. Aufgaben und Nachholbedarf der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [Civil Defense in Terms of Total Defense. Tasks and Accumulated Needs of the Federal Republic] by Juerg von Kalkreuth [Series: Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Vol. 18] Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1985; 234 pp, DM 29.-]

[Text] Although the debate concerning the shortcomings and alternatives of Western military strategy has become more wide-ranging and vociferous of late, it has hardly touched on the issue of civil defense at all. In the FRG as in many other Western nations, there seems to be a taboo regarding this particular aspect of planning and organizing for a possible future conflict.

A study undertaken by a retired Bundeswehr general aims to point up the existing shortcomings in FRG civil defense and to submit suggestions for thoroughgoing improvements to public scrutiny. The book's basic argument is that it would scarcely be realistic to try to protect the civilian population against the ravages of a major nuclear war but that the chances are good to afford at least some protection in case of conventional warfare. This view is also expressed in an introduction to the book by Ulrich de Maizière, a former Bundeswehr chief of staff.

The study is divided into seven chapters. Following a prefatory note in which the author states his essential purpose, he turns to the role assigned to civil defense in the total defense structure. The interesting thing here is that the national and international NATO agencies have laid down an extremely complex nomenclature and highly differentiated regulations on who does what in civil defense which almost makes one think of a kind of ghost bureaucracy. In any event, most of these things only exist on paper.

As compared with the civil defense efforts of the neutral nations of Western Europe in general and Switzerland in particular, this type of paper planning hardly amounts to anything at all. Even though von Kalkreuth resorts to the circumspect language of a general staff officer, he does reach similar conclusions--which is why his primary focus is on

ways of improving the system. The book's third chapter is devoted to a discussion of various models for a total defense staff under the FRG government. The subsequent chapters deal with principles and regulations applying to civilian-military cooperation--first in general terms and then on the basis of case studies.

Anyone who has a bit of imagination will feel somewhat uneasy reading the case study entitled "Civilian Population Movements and Military Mobilization" in which the author quite dispassionately discusses one of the central and seemingly unresolved problems (given the present state of military and civil defense planning) connected with a possible national emergency, as defined under Article 115a.

In the final chapter, the author summarizes his proposals for improvements once again. This is followed by an appendix containing charts and tables, excerpts from basic documents (e.g. legal provisions) on civil defense and a none-too-comprehensive bibliography for obvious reasons.

Both the author and the Ebenhausen Science and Policy Foundation which underwrote the project hope to overcome the problem-repressing silence which surrounds the civil defense issue. Civil defense, in fact, plays a major role in coping with the continuing changes in deterrent strategy occasioned by constant innovation in military technology. In addition, the book aims to make a decisive contribution to the--albeit none-too-profound--debate concerning the best possible Western strategy for preventing war. At the same time, it means to motivate the experts in the direction of improving the existing infrastructure.

In the short and medium term, as far as I can see, the author will succeed in bringing about the latter goal in view of the fact that his suggestions appear to be both efficient and cost-effective. But as for his primary goal, he will not reach it at all or at best indirectly or in the long term--because even if the language and makeup of this study were such that a non-professional reader could make more sense of it, the abovementioned taboo connected with the issue cannot really be overcome with the help of technocratic proposals, however substantive and serious-minded they may be.

But perhaps this would be too much to expect of this study which is at least capable of heightening the awareness of both the civilian and the military experts on the prevention and the consequences of war with regard to the problem of civil defense within the context of total defense--a problem which has been neglected far too long already.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

JENNINGER SEES ENLISTMENT OF WOMEN IN SERVICES AS FEASIBLE

West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 19 Dec 85 p 6

[Text] Speech by the President of the German Parliament at the 28th Commanders' Conference

Bundestag President Jenninger has publicly endorsed the concept of accepting women into the West German Armed Forces. In a speech to senior military officers at the 28th Commanders' Conference in Karlsruhe, Jenninger said that this cannot be a taboo subject for discussion. The draft for women is out of the question, but there are many possible assignments in the Armed Forces - in the administration, for example - which women could pick up. He is convinced that a consensus in public opinion will be reached.

The General Inspector of the Armed Forces, Altenburg, indicates that in the current planning period - into the 1990's - access to the Armed Forces for women is not expected. At the same time he poses the question, whether the heavy burden of military service should be borne by only a portion of the population. It must also be questioned whether the military can afford to reserve the opportunities for career advancement for men only. Altenburg reports that he has heard from the experiences with women in the American military, and the women are more persistent, tougher, and more tolerant and can bear greater drudgery. Opinion polls in West Germany would indicate that the number of women of corresponding age groups who are interested in service in the Armed Forces is over 70%.

Jenninger, who spoke out in favor of participation in the American plans for a missile defense system (SDI), referred in the following discussion to the "existentialist subject" of declining birth rates in West Germany. He stated that this extremely difficult problem is not being discussed with the necessary seriousness. He does not see enough attention paid to it in public discussion.

Earlier, in his presentation, Jenninger placed special worth on the idea that peace is firstly and above all secured by the Armed Forces and its soldiers, "and not by any movement which proclaims itself as a peace movement."

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### FIRST WARTIME HOST NATION COMMAND ORGANIZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by fy: "Support for American Troops"]

[Text] Bonn, 14 January--In the presence of Defense Minister Woerner and of American Ambassador Burt, the chief of staff of the army, General Sandrart, assigned the first unit of a new large-scale formation to the 3d military district command. This is Support Command 3 of the so-called "Wartime Host Nation Support" (WHNS). This is the designation of a large-scale unit comprising more than 93,000 German soldiers, which will be mobilized in case of crisis of war, to support 6 additional American divisions, which are to be sent to Europe in case of war. The Federal Republic obligated itself to establish these support components in an intergovernmental agreement made with the Americans 15 April 1982. The object of this agreement is to assure as rapid a reinforcement of the effective combat forces in Germany as possible in case of crisis or conflict.

The American quid pro quo consists of the unilateral declaration of intent to reinforce the Seventh Army, stationed in Germany, which presently comprises a full 5 divisions, by a further 6 divisions in such a case. To make this possible the American forces are presently building up depots which contain the entire allowance of weapons and material for these 6 divisions. The equipment for 4 divisions is already completely in storage, as the deputy chief of staff of the army, General Kasch, has reported; the equipment for the 2 remaining divisions will be stored in the depots distributed over the Netherlands, Belgium and the Federal Republic during the next 2 years.

The intention to make the German WHNS organization (which, with 93,000 soldiers and additional civilians, will in wartime assume the proportions of an army corps) operational by 1987 could not, as Kasch conceded, be carried out. According to him, structural problems have been decisive in this result. After the build-up had started at the end of 1982, a pause had to be introduced, which may not be ended before 1987. Kasch was unable to say when the German support organization would be operational; it will take several more years, according to him. The organization will be formed into 6 support commands, which will be assigned to the 6 military-district commands into which the Federal Republic is divided. The first of the support commands was assigned to the 3d military district on Tuesday in Cologne. These commands represent command activities, which are to plan, guide and coordinate, and to assure close cooperation with the Americans. Each support command will be led by a staff having only

32 soldiers and 9 civilian workers in peacetime and growing to more than 200 soldiers in case of war. In peacetime the command will be headed by a colonel, in case of war by a brigadier general. Its command echelon corresponds to that of a brigade. Nine battalions (as well as "further units") belong to each command, among them 4 transportation battalions, 2 ammunition-supply battalions, 1 fuel-supply battalion, and an ambulance battalion.

Among the military services to which the Bundeswehr is thus committed as regards the Americans are equipment transportation and transshipment, decontamination (disposition of nuclear-contaminated personnel and equipment), transport of wounded, security of American facilities, airfield maintenance, combat bridge-building, and weapons and equipment maintenance. Among the civil-sector services are rail, road and river transportation, maintenance, prepositioning of teleprinter and telephone facilities and of infrastructure plant, rations, and prepositioning of mobilization-reserve equipment.

In peacetime the German Wartime Host Nation Support Organization comprises only 1,050 soldiers and 760 civilian employees. There are in addition 650 military-training billets for reservists. It is remarkable that the creation of this reinforcement, which is important for the defense of Europe generally, is not organized as a NATO task, but rather is being carried out on the basis of a bilateral German-American agreement, under which both sides are assigned half the costs. In addition to investment outlays of 650 million marks apiece for Bonn and Washington, 70 million marks in annual operating expenses fall to the German side. Through 1985, 150 million marks of the investment had been spent on the German side.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# WOERNER EXPECTS GREATER NUMBER OF EXTENDED TERM VOLUNTEERS

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Dec 85 p 6

[Article: "Woerner To Recruit More Volunteers"]

[Text] Regular Duty Hours and Financial Incentives Promised at the Commanders' Conference

West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner wants to head off the threatening problem of personnel shortages in the Bundeswehr, which are a result of the dropping birth rate, not only by lengthening the service obligation of draftees but through increased recruitment of enlistees. There should be 40,000 volunteers next year with the longest possible enlistments.

Speaking to the 455 generals, admirals and colonels at the 28th Commanders' Conference, which ended on Thursday (19 Dec 85), Woerner announced measures being taken to make the "Job: Armed Forces" more attractive. This means that the commanding officers have to stimulate motivation in the young soldiers and give them some insight into the reasons for their activities. It is unacceptable for recruits to have a lower opinion of the Armed Forces after they muster out than they had before they were called up.

Specifically, Woerner listed regular duty hours, improvement in the offerings in training, and financial incentives. In a press conference which followed, Woerner promised that the premium for extended-enlistment soldiers, which was discontinued in 1980 for financial reasons, would be reintroduced if an improvement in the personnel situation is not achieved between 1986 and 1988. Woerner continued, saying that in the coming decade the Armed Forces will have to compete with industry for qualified manpower. The assistance for moving families of reassigned soldiers should be increased.

Besides the financial measures, the defense minister mentioned improvement in the human climate in the troops as an important contribution to improvement in fighting worth. Like General Inspector Wolfgang Altenburg, Woerner pointed to the important function of the reservists. In the future, 15,000 reservists will be drawn to training annually.

According to the German Press Agency, Woerner left no doubt in front of the commanders that the biggest current weaknesses are in the deficiencies in

modern ammunition, electronic warfare, night combat ability, and in the command system as well as in reconnaissance. Here a quick remedy has been found: the minister was pleased to announce that the budget cuts for operations and training have been set aside. Research and development outlays have been increased by 40 percent since 1983. NATO General Secretary Lord Peter Carrington painted an optimistic picture of the future of the Western alliance before the Bundeswehr Commanders. He pointed to the military improvements in the alliance. "NATO is in good shape," stated Lord Carrington. It has become stronger. Carrington underlined the need to further strengthen conventional weapons. He emphatically endorsed a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. He is cautiously optimistic about further progress in the disarmament conferences.

Reuters reported that Woerner called upon the European partners to develop defensive measures against the Soviet short-range nuclear arms aimed at Europe. The problem with short-range weapons could get more intense should the American SDI program for defense against long-range atomic weapons be realized. The Europeans need to consider just how they can master this growing threat by expanding their air defenses.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# NAVY TRAINS ELITE UNDERWATER DEMOLITION, SEAL COMBAT UNITS

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by Kurt Kister: "Swordfish in Murky Water. Hard Training and Claim as Elite: How the Two Special Naval Units Are Trained"]

[Text] At this time of the year the water in the Baltic Sea is leaden gray and dull in the Bay of Eckernfoerde. Even the sky over the bay is virtually the same color as the sea. Back on the horizon the line between water and air blurs, it gives the appearance of a single gray surface. Anyone who must be outside feels the cold from a light wind. The voice of Lieutenant Commander Uwe Stein interrupts the thoughts of the visitor who has arranged to view the landscape through the window from his warm chair, saying: "...and thus almost all who can dive at present are also outside." According to the commander of the mine clearance company, mine clearance diving is, after all, not "clear weather" business: "Drills and operations cannot be timed only for the warm season."

Lt Commander Stein commands a unit which enjoys a rather exclusive reputation in the 500,000-man Bundeswehr. Not quite 100 men are under him, about half of whom right after long and hard training have earned the right to wear a small badge above the right breast pocket. It depicts a swordfish in front of a stylized sea mine and represents the official action badge of the mine clearance divers. The Eckernfoerde diving company is a small but important part of the Federal German Navy's fighting forces, which in the event of an emergency are supposed to conduct offensive and defensive mine warfare in the North and Baltic Seas. Of course, the divers have nothing to do with the offensive aspect, that is, with mining enemy harbors, shipping channels and ocean areas.

Lieutenant (junior grade) Gerd Weber explains that "we recognize two primary tasks, namely explosive ordnance reconnaissance and explosive ordnance disposal." He uses an example to illustrate how a typical mine clearance diver operation looks in peacetime: "Perhaps a fisherman reports to us that somewhere in the sea he has discovered an unidentifiable object." Now there are different ways to identify this "object." A minehunter which is equipped with sonar equipment can be sent out. This equipment emits sound waves which reflect off the object and are picked up on the boat as a more or less characteristic signal. A remote-controlled minisubmarine, which with

a television camera transmits pictures of the ocean bottom to the mine-hunter's operations center, provides another method. If, of course, this form of high tech fails or is being used elsewhere, then the mine clearance divers must get involved and go in.

Mine clearance diver officer Weber says that "anyone who has dived in the Baltic Sea knows that there are many places where visibility is zero." Then, more or less over the stated location of the object, the divers move along the line of a buoy slowly into the murky depths. In order to finally locate the object the "circle attack method" can be employed. A line is attached to the diving buoy's weight and let out in its entire length. Then the diver swims in a circle around the buoy and hopes that the object being sought gets caught in the line. If this does not happen, then the buoy must be moved or the radius of the circle enlarged.

### Mines Are Recovered

If on his own or guided by the intelligence from the minehunter the diver has finally reached the object he must identify it. In relatively clear water this is not a problem, but quite another matter at zero visibility. With the steadiest hands possible the frogman then feels the surface of the explosive device in order after surfacing to be able to describe it precisely to his mission controller. Weber says that "if we have learned in one way or another what kind of "object" it is, we will have then completed explosive ordnance reconnaissance and can tackle explosive ordnance disposal."

The type of disposal depends on what was found. A training mine, for example, which does not contain an explosive charge, is simply recovered with a cable. Of course, if what was found is explosive, if, for example, it is an unexploded torpedo from the war or one of the still numerous armed mines, then a mine clearance diver rating with the appropriate training goes down in order to disarm the dangerous object, that is, to deactivate the existing ignition mechanism. If recovery and subsequent disarming appear relatively safe, then the explosive device is lifted to the surface. If this is too risky, then the diving artificer attaches a demolition charge which following his return to the boat is detonated by command firing.

The navy's active mine clearance divers, who are barely 50 in number, must, in view of the operational demands, complete an arduous training period. Lt Commander Stein says that "anyone wanting to join us must have committed himself for at least 4 years and be completely healthy." After an 8-week scuba diving course at the Technical Naval School in Neustadt/Holstein those who have completed this training with a least a grade of 3 can join the mine clearance company. There they expect 4 additional months of training and tests in which the focus is clearly on diving and swimming. Lt (jg) Weber says that "swimming, long-distance diving, equipment knowledge and a great deal of athletic activity shape the mine clearance diver. The sea must quite clearly be approached as if one wanted to turn into a fish." Among the possibly 30 examinees in a course there are for the most part no more than 10 who have the stuff to become a fish with arms and legs in a neoprene suit.

Staff sergeants (who are called chief petty officers in the navy) and officers of the mine clearance divers must complete additional courses beyond this "basic training," chiefly in order to train in handling explosives of all kinds and disposing of them. Moreover, many of them also still wear Ranger and Paratrooper badges. For the continuing courses the seamen must leave Eckernfoerde to go to schools which are distributed throughout the FRG, for example the NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] School in Sonthofen, the School for Engineering Units in Aachen or even the Airborne School in Altenstadt.

Of course, there are also training opportunities in the navy barracks in Eckernfoerde. Especially "impressive" in this respect is a sizable teaching and study collection of a large number of shells, mines, torpedoes and bombs of all kinds. The exhibits of this martial display are used to familiarize future and trained mine clearance divers with the characteristic properties of these objects which they can encounter in their wet career on the bottom of the sea, as well as on land in offshore areas, so that they can locate, identify, disarm, recover and detonate them. The objects which must be recovered, moreover, do not always include only explosive devices--as demonstrated by the section of a Tornado control surface in the company building. In the course of its 21-year existence the mine clearance company had to raise to the surface many an airplane wreck. The Bundeswehr divers also occasionally provide official aid to the police in recovering divers or swimmers who have met with an accident.

Anyone who takes a walk in the barracks on the Bay of Eckernfoerde can, of course, in addition to the swordfish in front of the mine, see yet another action badge on blue or green cloth, which is likewise equally uncommon: It is also a swordfish, in this case against a background of a stylized parachute. Those who wear it claim--at least after a certain warmup period in private conversation--to have completed the most comprehensive, most diverse and the hardest training of all the soldiers in the Bundeswehr and always to have to maintain this level of performance: These are combat swimmers. And in fact, anyone in the army who asks about the military elite, never gets the generals, occasionally the airborne landing personnel and mountain infantry, frequently long-range reconnaissance scouts and almost always the combat swimmers. Their number is even smaller than that of their neighbors, the mine clearance divers. The combat swimmer company has three combat units with 15 men each.

It is not very easy to say where the mythos comes from which wafts around the company. It certainly is related to the fact that combat swimmers must satisfactorily complete virtually every kind of special military training which gives training in the individual skills of unidentified infiltration, the destruction of material, killing people and surviving under the most difficult conditions. This also presupposes that every active combat swimmer is capable of peak athletic performance both in and out of the water. Water training, for example, includes an endurance swim from Kiel to Olpenitz, covering a distance of 30 km. The distance must be completed in 48 hours including an overnight somewhere on the beach--all of this, of course, with



full equipment. Almost all combat swimmers have also completed the free-fall course. In this they must prove that they can jump from a height of several thousand meters in a free fall from an airplane and not pull the ripcord of the parachute until several hundred meters from the ground--a technique which lowers the probability of early detection of the jumper in the air.

Company commander, Lieutenant Ulrich Koehler, reports that for several years there have been scarcely any recruitment worries in regard to the combat swimmers. Koehler says that "the failing rate is to be sure quite high, but we get enough volunteers who are attracted to us." In this, in the opinion of the lieutenant, the "attractiveness of the service" plays a role, but no doubt so does the image of the company. Koehler says: "Of course, even in training we are hard on the boys, we show them roughly twice a week where their physical performance limit is. A combat swimmer, who must depend on himself alone in the event of an emergency, must be able to struggle hard." One thing is certain: Anyone who after 1 and ½ years has completed all the necessary courses has really struggled hard as perhaps no others in the army.

"Rambos" or Realists?

In terms of military concepts the combat swimmers' mission is predominantly offensive. Of course, they are also employed to protect their own naval bases against enemy combat swimmers. But mainly they are to combat military targets on or close to the water. These can be ships which are eliminated from combat with limpit mines (French combat swimmers were involved in the sinking of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior...). Along the coast there are radar stations, airfields, rocket emplacements--they are all possible targets for the rangers from the sea. A typical drill for combat swimmers may include a night landing of a team from a boat or helicopter into the sea and approaching the coast with the help of a silent diving device which produces no air bubbles. On land the men then penetrate likewise as soundlessly as possible a simulated radar position, "kill" guard details with automatic assault rifles with silencers or with a knife, place their charges and disappear back into the sea after detonating them.

To the visitor this all sounds a little bit as if Lt Koehler were commanding a hord of Rambos with the official flag on the sleeve of their wetsuits. He promptly rejects that, saying: "No, we do not need daredevils, but rather realists who know what they can do. To complete a mission successfully in our case also means not getting caught. True, in this our methods are a bit different than in the rest of the army."

The self-assurance of the combat swimmers was elevated a bit by the Falkland war--if that is at all possible. There, their English comrades from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) carried out a whole series of undertakings which cost the Argentinians a great deal of blood and material. The exchange of experiences among allies is emphasized in Eckernfoerde. There is a permanent liaison officer from the U.S. Navy's special unit, the SEAL's (for sea, air land), with the combat swimmers. Frequently there are joint exercises with Englishmen, Frenchmen, Danes and other nations which support similar units.

The Hardthoehe, too, appears to be satisfied with the performance level of the combat swimmers. In the official journal MARINE it says in intimitable military officialese that "the striving for efficiency to achieve the greatest possible successes with a minimum of personnel and material" is making "the combat swimmer into a cost-favorable full-value naval military resource." The commander of these human naval military resources, Lt Koehler, responds first with an economical argument to the question whether his people view themselves as elite: "Yes, because if I invest so much time and expense in a soldier, he is indeed an elite soldier." And naturally: pride in ability and performance contributes to cultivating a feeling of elitism. Koehler's comrade from the mine clearance divers, Lt Commander Uwe Stein, says it is difficult to acknowledge in this army that you are a member of the elite. Stein says: "We have always been taught not to display a flag, but now if suddenly the whole world wants to see elite units again, we will vigorously work on our purposely subdued feeling of self-esteem." Of course his men would have an advantage there: "If some time later it is not so opportune as it is today to be better than others and also to how it, then we will simply dive away again...."

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MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

# READINESS, CAPABILITY OF 1ST NETHERLANDS CORPS ASSESSED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Dec 85 p 12

[Article by Siegfried Thielbeer: "The 1st Netherlands Corps and the Bundeswehr German Armed Forces Can Work Well Together."]

[Text] Dutch soldiers? They are resentful, they have beards and long strands under their hairnets, and they don't salute their officers. The country is not on the NATO front line and is undermined by pacifism, and in any case they do not contribute enough towards the common defense of the West. This is roughly how people all over view this ally. Knowledgeable people have a noticeably different opinion. The commanders and officers of the 1st. German Corps give consistent high marks to the Dutch soldiers who are their neighbors in the north German Lowlands. This judgment was again confirmed at the fall maneuvers, in which the Netherlands armored brigade which is stationed in Germany, and another division from Holland separately took part. Looking the other way, the commander of the Netherlands 1st. Corps, Lieutenant General Loos, and his division commanders who observed the "Defiant Saxon" maneuver, had a high opinion of the German soldiers. General Loos reported that when he visited his soldiers, there were only a few left with long hair. First impressions last long, though...

In a crisis situation, the Netherlands Corps would be assigned to the commander of the Army Group North (Northag), and would therefore be the northern neighbor of the German 1st. Corps. It would have the task of protecting the area south of Hamburg with its two active divisions and the reserve division. There is great satisfaction on both sides with the capacity for cooperation and interoperability. There are neither problems with language - almost all Dutch speak German and English - nor with the tactical fundamentals or common use of material. The Dutch are almost completely equipped with the same weapons as the German soldiers - they run 900 modernized Leopard-I and Leopard-II tanks and 2000 armored personnel carriers, and fire the same ammunition out of over 300 tank cannon. The German soldiers have more difficulties with the British soldiers bordering on the south, and the Americans in the Bremen area. Cooperation with the German Territorial Command North, which will be responsible for insuring passage for the Dutch soldiers, is characterized by both sides as excellent.

The exchange of troops is practiced often, German and Dutch units often train together. Officers visit the partner's schools, where faculty are also exchanged. The methods of leadership are thereby consistent between both parties. "A Netherlands officer could take command of a German company or even a brigade at any time without any difficulty," said an officer from the German armored brigade. The only problem that General Loos could think of, after a long time, was that "our soldiers prefer to drink coffee and do not care for the German peppermint tea."

There is only one brigade of Dutch stationed in Germany in peacetime: the 41st Armored Brigade in Seedorf. The two other infantry brigades of the 4th Division are housed in the Netherlands, as are the armored brigade and the two infantry brigades of the 1st Division. The route to the deployment area is over 200 miles clear across northern Germany. Would these troops, which are somewhat weighted down with cadre, make it in time in a crisis situation? No doubt, the Dutch would also like to have a greater peacetime presence in Germany. General Loos explains the historical background to this situation: originally there were only the British and the Americans stationed in this area, dating back to the time of the occupation - and they took the existing barracks facilities. Only after the Berlin crisis was a Netherlands brigade also moved forward.

Practically speaking, there is no room for a second brigade, according to Loos. In addition, a move - with all the necessary construction - would cost a lot of money, which the Dutch would have to come up with themselves. When weighing the alternatives of stationing a second brigade in the front area ("What does that really achieve?") or spending the money on equipment for the Dutch troops, it was decided in agreement with the Nato commanders to give precedence to the equipment. The brigade in Seedorf has been brought up to full combat strength and is equipped with additional artillery. A large number of rail flatcars for transporting armored vehicles has also been acquired, to insure quick transport of the Netherlands troops independently of the West German railroad.

The rapidity of mobilization and the deployment in the combat zone have been tested many times, most recently on a large scale in September 1983. Two Netherlands divisions and an American one flown in from Texas had trained in Germany then. Loos says that too often they cannot do this because of the burden upon the civilian population and the conditions of the exercise. In any case, full deployment was achieved in three days, as planned. The fact that the Netherlands are dependent to a great extent upon reservists to fill out the units does not need to be a disadvantage. "Our country is very small and densely populated. The call-up only takes a few hours." The reservists are assigned as a group as in their old units: one company per battalion. The team spirit of the troops is important. The filling-out of the reserve division naturally takes somewhat longer, but thanks to the presence of the division staff and the brigade cells, it can also be accomplished quickly. Call-up exercises such as "Thunderclap", when they are mobilized for three days without any advance warning at different times, show that 82 percent of those called-up also show up - "and that is in peacetime, when the order perhaps does not need to be taken that seriously."

German observers confirm that these soldiers close ranks to perform their duties and are prepared to make sacrifices, and ready to be deployed in rain and snow. It is of decisive importance here, as with the German soldiers, to avoid make-work and idleness. "If something does not work," according to General Loos, "it is almost always the command's fault."

It turns out that they are considering an extension of time in service in the Netherlands, too. The reason here is not the drop in births - only about half of the 100,000 available for the draft are needed - but instead the requirements of military-technical training. Expert opinion believes that 14 months of duty (four for basic training and ten in the active company) is insufficient for many of the complicated weapons systems. They would rather have a flexible system (between 10 and 20 months).

Such a system fits in with General Loos' ideas, too. With the modernization of equipment, introduction of new tanks and vehicles, of radar and communications gear, he is "overall not unsatisfied, even though there are things to be desired." When he looks at the balance, he sees that given the modern equipment for battle and the quality of his soldiers there is "a good chance they can achieve a successful defense."

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MILITARY

NORWAY

#### AIR FORCE SHORTAGE OF PILOTS, COMMANDERS EXAMINED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 1 Mar 86 p 13

[Article by Nina Sandas: "Norwegian Air Force Pilots Seek Civilian Jobs"]

[Text] Oslo--There is an acute shortage of experienced pilots for F-16 fighter planes, which has caused a deterioration in defense preparedness. There is an officer crisis in the Air Force and an incipient crisis in the Army. These obvious weaknesses in the Norwegian defense system have been discussed publicly this winter after central NATO sources also expressed uneasiness about conditions in the Air Force.

The pilot shortage, which is especially severe in the case of fighter pilots, is the result of a development that has been going on for a long time. An adequate number of people still apply to the pilot school in Varnes each year. But the civilian airlines are draining the Air Force of experienced capable pilots after they have finished their 8 years of obligatory military service. The main attraction is salaries that are twice as high as those paid by the military.

SAS is the major villain in this context but other Norwegian airlines have also benefited from signing up trained pilots. A pilot costs the military a total of 7 million marks when he has completed his training in the United States.

Some bitterness can be detected among commanding officers when it comes to those who have left for civilian jobs.

"Many have gone through the military pilot training program for the sole purpose of getting a civilian job as soon as possible," was a comment heard during a visit to the Bodo military air base. But they can sympathize with those who have left too, because the wages and other working conditions are deplorable.

#### Saying Goodbye

Last year an unusually large number of pilots said goodbye to the military. The situation became untenable for the Air Force and it sounded the alarm.

The crisis was described under big headlines in the Norwegian media. And international military publications also took up the subject in reports from Norway.

Exact figures on how many pilots were missing were never revealed. That would have meant totally exposing a weakness in the defense system. But according to reports in the press the Air Force could man only two-thirds of its fighter planes. These are primarily the well-known F-16's of which Norway has acquired 72 during the 1980's (four of them have crashed). It has also been charged that four of the five fighter squadrons had problems meeting the requirements for "operative status."

Defense sources said that the situation was regarded as critical. "Crisis" and "problem" were words that occurred frequently in newspaper columns as recently as a month ago. The whole thing was not just a question of getting a reduced number of airplanes off the ground in a future conflict. Efficiency and experience are extremely important qualities in the Air Force and they are in short supply when older pilots leave the service. The Air Force will soon run out of people who can lead and further train pilots fresh out of training school. Experienced pilots are also needed for administrative jobs on staffs and at operation centers.

#### Allied Distrust?

The officer crisis and the pilot shortage could have other very serious consequences, according to defense sources. It could lead allied air forces that hold regular exercises and Norway and are supposed to be sent here if there is a crisis or a war to refuse to subordinate themselves to Norwegian command. In the past this has been a central principle in Norwegian security policy. And in order to maintain that principle it is important to have competent Norwegians manning all levels of the command structure.

This weakness in the Air Force involves Norwegian credibility within the NATO alliance as well as in relation to the Soviet Union and according to the newspaper AFTENPOSTEN this is what created some misgivings among central NATO figures.

In an effort to deal with the acute situation the Defense Ministry recently decided to introduce a kind of bonus system for fighter pilots. On completion of their obligatory service with the Air Force 50 pilots will now be offered around 850,000 marks in extra pay if they sign a new 15-year contract. The sum, which will be distributed over the entire period, must be repaid if the contract is broken. A new proposal to join forces with Sweden and Denmark to offer civilian pilot training was also presented as one way of helping to resolve the crisis in the air forces of these countries and meet the civilian airlines' big need for pilots in the years ahead.

The impression given at the Bodo air base was that the bonus system was just an emergency solution that would not solve the problem in the long run.

"It's just a lottery to count on extra pay when the bonus is limited to 50 pilots."

Major Peter Archer is one of the lucky lottery winners. He was seriously considering going to work for SAS when the offer came through.

"Unfortunately this kind of one-time offer is not enough. The whole military personnel policy needs to be reviewed. Compared to the private sector most personnel categories are far behind. And those of us who are sent to serve in North Norway need extra benefits such as better borrowing opportunities and improved housing standards. It creates big problems for many families if a wife can't get work or the daycare facilities for children are inadequate at a base," he said.

The shortage of personnel and other problems are just as great on the technical side in the Air Force. Major Age Stole, head of the aeronautics squadron at Bodo, said that there were periodic difficulties in meeting the requirement that 70 percent of the planes at the base be combat-ready at all times.

Around 400 technical jobs are unfilled nationwide. It is especially hard to hold onto people with a background in computers and electronics.

A special office in the Defense Ministry now has the job of reviewing and proposing various measures to recruit new personnel for the Norwegian military and keep officers from leaving. The Army also has personnel problems in various sectors, but they are not as severe as the problems in the Air Force.

It no longer gives as much status as it used to to choose a career in the military and consequently the entire personnel policy must be reviewed.

This is a very difficult problem to deal with. The low wages are a feature of all state jobs, but a great deal can be done to improve things without spending a large amount of money, according to Defense Ministry press spokesman Erik Senstad.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

## FEW BARRIERS REMAIN FOR WOMEN IN DEFENSE FORCES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 2 Mar 86 p 12

[Text] In theory Norwegian women have been on an equal footing with men for the past year when it comes to careers in the military and the right to perform military service. The defense forces can tempt them with free training but so far there has been no great rush to join the military. About 500 women officers and enlisted personnel are currently being trained or serving in the armed forces.

Storting took the first step toward the present rights enjoyed by women in 1977 when it decided that women should be given limited access on a voluntary basis to military service and defense functions. This was a natural result of the equality debate of the 1970's, a debate that also led to a special law on equal rights.

Up to 1984 women recruits received shorter periods of training than their male colleagues in separate recruit schools. They received no training in the use of weapons. And women did not have the right to perform general military duties.

### Volunteers Welcome

The restrictions have gradually eased. The only major difference today is that women are not drafted. But if they volunteer they are welcome.

Since last year Norwegian women have had the legal right to demand military career training and military service on equal terms with their male counterparts. Military service lasts from 12 to 15 months. Women who volunteer for military service must also promise to obey the rules concerning mobilization and wartime service. The rules are in effect for the same length of time as they are for men. The only special regulations for exempting women from performing military duties involve women's "special life circumstances," i.e. pregnancy and childbirth.

Otherwise no distinctions are made between men and women. On the purely physical level women are assigned to the same camps and barracks as men on the same level. It is true that there are separate sleeping quarters for women but in many camps they share the same sanitary facilities.

The distinction in performing combat duties has also been dropped as a result of Storting's decision. This has not yet been carried out in practice in all branches of the service. The Army expects that all combat units and officer training as well as basic training will be open to both sexes by next year at the latest.

#### Navy Restrictions

There will be some restrictions in the Navy during a transitional period due to problems connected with assigning a large number of women to naval vessels. But all officer training in the Navy is available to women. The first two women officers graduated from the naval academy last summer.

The last barrier fell last year in the Air Force when women were allowed to compete for fighter pilot training slots. Two women have already been trained as pilots in Norway and several more are in the process of being trained.

A survey showed that almost 500 women, officers and enlisted personnel, serving or still in training, are currently enrolled in the defense forces. Over 2,200 women would report for duty in the event of a mobilization.

"There are still so few women with military training in the service and in the reserves that they do not have much importance with regard to Norwegian defense," said Defense Ministry press spokesman Erik Senstad. He felt it would be a long time before women in Norway are subject to the draft.

Thus many more women will have to choose to serve their country in the military than is now the case if they are to fill the gaps in the ranks that will result from the drastic shrinkage in the eligible age groups that is going to occur in the 1990's.

#### Chance Circumstances

Hege Aune, a second lieutenant in the medical company of the North Norway brigade stationed in inland Troms, did not deliberately choose a military career, although she can soon be regarded as a veteran with 5 1/2 years of military service.

"I ended up here as the result of a number of chance circumstances," she said.

When she was 20 she applied for nurse's training but was turned down. Instead she entered the military's 1-year officer training school, followed by a year of compulsory service. By then she had enough points to qualify for the military quota for nurse trainees.

The military paid for her training. In addition she received full pay during the 3 years she was in school. In return she and others with a similar military background signed a 6-year service contract. If the contract is



broken she must repay the armed forces for the expenses incurred in connection with her nurse's training.

Second Lieutenant Aune had no qualms about signing a 6-year contract with the military.

"Of course there are drawbacks, for example one has to move from one military base to another at regular intervals. I came here to North Norway in January from the Oslo district. But the advantages outweigh the negative aspects. My work is varied and I am always meeting new people," she said.

#### Mild Jokes

She has not encountered prejudiced or disparaging remarks from male superiors or colleagues. Mild jokes about the physical weakness of women often have to be taken back when men find out that women can do as much as they can.

"I enjoy the atmosphere. But I am not sure I will spend my whole life working for the military. That depends on whether I have a family. It can be hard to combine this life with having small children, when we are sometimes out on maneuvers for weeks at a time. And it would also depend on how a husband would react to the fact that we live under the same conditions and in the same tent with the rest of the group when we are on maneuvers," concluded Lt Hege Aune. Incidentally she will become a first lieutenant this summer.

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ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

#### DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE VIEWED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 8/9 Mar 86 p 9

[Article by (ho): "The Future of Exports to the East is Uncertain. Austria Fights for Market Position"]

[Text] It is difficult to assess the future development of domestic exports to the East. In some communist countries, new people are coming to power. Simultaneously, planned economies are beset by many factors of uncertainty, such as falling oil prices. Dr Friedrich Gleissner, chief of the section for trade policy and foreign trade of the Bundeskammer, stated on the occasion of the foreign trade congress "East Europe" in Vienna, that industry will continue to intensify its efforts for the COMECON region.

Gleissner emphasized that COMECON's share in Austrian foreign trade has been relatively stable. In 1955, exports amounted to 9.9 percent, and 11.1 percent last year. Imports made up 9.4 percent and 10.5 percent, respectively. The West European share also remained unchanged, despite integration.

At the beginning of the new 5-year plans for the period 1986 to 1990 there are some uncertainties as to how future business will develop. There are also uncertainties caused by personnel changes which will have an effect in the USSR, especially. In the other COMECON countries there are no such dramatic cadre changes.

Austrian exports to the COMECON area grew only modestly last year. This is exclusively due to setbacks in the USSR and the GDR, where large projects were concluded in 1984. In the other COMECON countries, considerable growth rates were achieved.

The most important market by far in the COMECON area is the USSR; worldwide, it is the sixth most important buyer of Austrian products.

Among Austria's supplier countries, it has held third place for years. The Austrian trade delegate in Moscow, Dr Friedrich Drasczyk, thinks that foreign currency losses due to lower oil prices will be between one-fourth and one-third for the USSR, if the present price level continues. Imports

from the West would be cut back accordingly, and machine purchases would probably suffer most. Western exporters must now expect even stronger demands for reciprocal trade deals with the USSR.

#### Hungary Became the Second-Largest Purchaser

Due to the strong rise in deliveries to Hungary, this country now holds second place among COMECON buyers of Austrian products. The trade delegate in Budapest, Dr Ladislaus Wagner, is of the opinion that there are no uncertainty factors in Hungary with regard to personnel changes, and that the reform course will be continued unchanged. Reciprocal trade deals, however, play an important role. Austrian export chances are good.

The decrease of exports to the GDR, the third most important market in COMECON, is due to the completion of large projects. However, the trade delegate in East Berlin, MBA Stefan Wratschko, expects a 50 percent increase in Austrian exports during the current 5-year plan.

Exports to Poland were expanded significantly. Trade delegate Dr Walter Resl stresses that deliveries, with the exception of grain, are paid for in cash. In the CSSR, also, Austria managed to further strengthen its good market position last year. Since the country's economic situation has consolidated, the trade delegate in Prague, Dr Benedikt Winkler, expects a loosening of the present restrictive import policy of Czechoslovakia.

After the excellent results in Bulgaria, it may be difficult this year to achieve the export results of last year, opined the trade delegate in Sofia, Dr Andreas Klade. Despite the difficult financial situation in Romania, Dr Gottfried Bauernfeind, trade delegate in Bucharest, expects good export results there through personal contacts and marketing.

The problems of Austrian nationalized enterprises are also followed in the East, but no great loss in confidence occurred. The new Voest leadership plans visits to the East bloc countries in order to clarify the situation.

# Foreign Trade with COMECON Countries in 1985

	Export in 1,000 S	Change vs. 1984 in %	Import in 1,000 S	Change vs. 1984 in %	Balance of Trade
Bulgaria	2,706,174	+18.3	764,365	+14.8	+1,941,809
CSSR	3,888,223	+11.1	8,328,997	+ 5.9	-4,440,774
GDR	4,413,881	-35.2	2,641,588	+ 4.0	+1,772,293
People's Rep. of Mongolia	20,993	+28.7	1,321	+82.5	+ 19,672
Poland	4,288,518	+26.1	4,773,377	- 5.2	- 484,859
Romania	1,130,534	+ 0.7	1,609,381	- 5.6	- 478,847
USSR	13,409,894	- 4.7	19,150,890	- 2.4	-5,740,996
Hungary	9,162,188	+31.6	8,501,940	+ 4.8	+ 660,248
<hr/>					
Total	39,020,405	+ 2.2	45,771,859	+ 0.5	-6,751,454
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World total	353,962,448	+12.5	430,969,325	+ 9.9	-77,006,877
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CSO: 3620/642

## MINISTER OF INDUSTRY TEMPERS PREVAILING OPTIMISM

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 1 Dec 85 pp 270-273

[Interview with Renato Altissimo, minister of industry, by Salvatore Gatti; date and place not given]

[Text] In the world of Italian industry, optimism is now in vogue. The end of the long season of balance sheets in the red, the sky-high invoices, the boom of the stock exchange and investment funds that have brought fresh money to businesses have created precisely that "widespread optimism among the ranks of managers" of which Guido Carli speaks, such optimism contrasts however, "with the voices that are raised to warn of the gravity of the situation."

It is certainly not accidental that indeed, in this euphoric climate the Confindustria of Luigi Lucchini has decided to cool the enthusiasm with its megashow, in which everyone from Gianni Agnelli to Ciriaco De Mita are taking part, and which is unfolding in the last few days of this troubled November 1985 at Turin Lingotto. "Our economy is growing very slowly; if we do not wish to resign ourselves to a distressing future, marked by very high unemployment, it is necessary to change direction," is the realistic message of Confindustria; "and it is necessary to do so quickly, because the other countries, our competitors, are already doing it."

Is then the magic moment already over for Italian business? We asked Minister of Industry Renato Altissimo. "I do not truly believe that great optimism makes sense at this moment. It is true that we are emerging from the follies of the 1970's, which upset the Italian industrial system, and therefore even the present modest recovery is an important fact. On the other hand, however, it is true that today the situation is not at all rosy for our industries."

[Question] What is the picture of Italian industry at the end of 1985?

[Answer] It is not a pretty picture. This year in Italy, industrial production is rising by 2.5 percent, in Germany by almost 6 percent, in England by 3.5 percent. We can find some consolation in comparison with France, which is doing worse. Ours, however, is an unhealthy growth, and for many reasons. The most serious reason is that in order to export, in order to hold down prices, our industries forfeit and restrain high profits; they again become undercapitalized (causing investments to fall), thereby jeopardizing their future.



[Question] But at least the favorable course of the labor costs helps them...

[Answer] No longer, unfortunately. After a tranquil 1984, during which the cost of labor per unit produced increased by 5 percent, we are now proceeding at an increased rate of about 7 percent. And also labor productivity, which had increased by more than 5 percent over the previous year, is progressing this year less than 4 points. These are not reassuring figures."

[Question] But can we not say at least that Italian firms have risen from the abyss of the seventies?

[Answer] Yes, but only this. There is no longer an anti-industrialist culture in the country (not even in the unions); profit is no longer vilified; jobs can be reduced to save the industries and the welfarism of the Catholic-Communist bloc is less fashionable. And so balance sheets look better today: businesses again report profits, even if very modest compared to their foreign competitors. Then, the financial situation of businesses is improving, particularly public enterprises that are approaching the level of private enterprise. But in reality this relatively good situation, like the leopard's spots, lacks uniformity.

[Question] Who is going well and who is doing badly?

[Answer] If we look at the exports and imports, we see immediately that a few sectors are doing well, like the textile industry (which this year has already given us more than 10 trillion lire in sales), and the high technology sector, such as machine tools (over 8 trillion lire in sales). But we are losing tens of trillions of lire for energy, for food, for chemicals, and even for means of transportation, an unpleasant surprise of 1985. One cannot therefore be at ease.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because the results achieved are fragile. And they are fragile because the atmosphere surrounding business enterprises has remained in large part hostile to their growth. And for various reasons. The first is that the great strangleholds hindering the firms have not been eliminated; the second is that the general situation of the country damages them.

[Question] In what way?

[Answer] There are two very precise causes: Italy's high inflation and the extremely heavy public deficit. The first causes production costs, and therefore the prices of our industry's goods, to increase at a rate that is double that of competitors' merchandise; in order to avoid that, i.e. in order to sell the same merchandise at the same prices as the others, our firms forfeit a good part of their profits, and suffer all the harmful consequences for the future.

The public deficit, in order to finance itself, needs the state to issue treasury bills (Bot) and treasury credit certificates (CCT) at high interest

rates in order to attract the public. And the banks, in order to meet the Treasury competition, must offer high interest rates to those who loan them money, which they then give to the enterprises at a very high final cost. Thus our gigantic public deficit ends up damaging industry, which must pay for money three times more than their foreign competitors.

[Question] You say that a few strangleholds that were never eliminated also hinder our industries...

[Answer] Yes. And there are many, unfortunately. It is enough to think about energy: not having built nuclear plants in time means that today, for Italian firms, the cost of the kilowatt is double that of competitors. Not to mention transportation or telecommunications (it takes 2 years to obtain even a modest telex). But the saddest note, the greatest stranglehold, is the labor market.

[Question] Why particularly sad?

[Answer] Because it not only damages industry, but in a direct way also the possibility of creating new jobs. Here is a concrete very recent example: Sears & Roebuck, one of the world giants, submitted an important work order to a company of Rivoli Iorinese. In order to assume the commitment, the latter company would have to hire 150 persons for a short time. Since rigid Italian laws, however, do not permit short-term hiring for a specific job, the Rivoli company therefore would have had to retain those 150 people even after the work ended. Since the risk to the firm was excessive, it decided to decline, refusing the deal. The result was that 150 people remained without that work.

"This one instance is like so many others, but the rigidity of the labor market also has negative effects on the young. If a 16-year old boy (a former apprentice) costs little less than a skilled worker with his professionalism, why should the company hire the youth? Thus, Italy, after eliminating the reduced salary for the young, has reached a little envied record in youth unemployment among industrial nations. Should not these strangleholds be eliminated? Is it not clear that should they be eliminated, the economic system would have more impetus and provide more jobs?

[Question] Then those like Confindustria, who ask for industry's freedom from the fetters that hinder it, are not wrong?

[Answer] I would say 'no' indeed, even though it seems to me that even in the trade unions many attitudes have changed. But there are, however, many objectives which Italy must pursue, and rapidly, if we do not want last year's optimism to give way to new calamities for industry and for the country.

[Question] What objectives?

[Answer] There are two types of exigencies; the objectives of the general economic policy and the more specific provisions for industry. On the first front the "must," the absolute priority for industrial policy is to bring Italian inflation within the next 2 years, to levels compatible with those of

competitors: at most to 4 percent. The other general objective is the serious job of both managing the public debt and reducing expenditures to be done with greater incisiveness than required by today's financial laws.

[Question] But aren't provisions aimed specifically at strengthening industry also needed?

[Answer] They are three, in my opinion. One has already been initiated: the unblocking of Law 675 at the EC (which had doubts about its legitimacy) will, together with other industrial laws, bring useful financing to industry. Perhaps more important, however, is the new fiscal law for the tax exemption of profits that are reinvested in new machinery; this law, already under discussion, must be expanded and made more efficient and provide greater tax exemptions. One can also intervene immediately on the labor front: besides establishing with certainty that the cost of labor cannot increase more than inflation, it is necessary to eliminate many rigid legislative mechanisms, replacing them with more flexible guidelines. It is necessary to introduce the concept of part-time, reduced salaries for apprentices, work contracts for a fixed period of time, freedom to hire from a designated list, and a new form of wage supplement find that is not permanent (there are companies that have survived this way for 15 years), but temporary.

[Question] A lash to bring about a more American climate in industry...



[Answer] Let's not be too ironic, please. In the last few years millions of jobs have been created in the United States. If, acting on several fronts, we were also to succeed in moving in that direction, it would certainly not be a bad thing.

After several good years, Italian industry is beginning to encounter serious difficulties. The added value, as seen in the first graph, increased (even in 1985 it remained at the level of 1984) only slightly compared to the past. Industrial production, in the last year and a half, increased very slowly, as seen in the second graph.

Five Years of Industry



Industrial Production



According to the third graph, the cost of labor per unit produced, after modest increases, is starting to rise rapidly and labor productivity, on the contrary, is no longer increasing very much. (Source: Ministry of Industry)

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CSO: 3528/56

ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

### ECONOMIC PLANKS OF PARTY PLATFORMS CRITICIZED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD in Dutch 15 Mar 86 p 13

[Article by M. Peter van der Hoek: "CDA, VVD and PVDA All Claim More Than They Can Fulfill"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Even with a sympathetic interpretation, the PVDA platform has a gap of about four billion guilders. For the CDA there is a discrepancy that is practically as large between desires and possibilities. The VVD financial platform is financially balanced--but anything can be put down on paper. But why should political parties draw up responsible platforms? After all, the voters don't read them.

Elections are truly remarkable events. The most remarkable thing is perhaps the high turnout of enfranchised voters. Since the abolition of compulsory voting, there has scarcely been one rational reason for the individual voter to go to the polls. After all, his vote has such a marginal influence on the election results that it can in fact be considered to be zero. If on 21 May for one reason or another it turns out that you are not able to vote, this will have no political consequences in The Hague. Seen in these terms, it is also not worthwhile for the voter to familiarize himself with the platforms of the political parties. It would just mean time and effort, while his one single vote has no effect anyway.

In fact, there are indeed scarcely any voters to be found who read, much less study, the platform of a political party. The vast majority do not make their decisions on the basis of information gleaned directly from the party platforms. If voters rely on party platforms at all, they generally do so indirectly, on the basis of information that reaches them via television, radio, newspapers and magazines. As a consequence, it appears plausible to say that the political interest of the voters primarily stems from the large amount of attention given to political events by the media. This assumption is only strengthened by the fact that less than four percent of the population age 20 and above belongs to a political party.

But let us now imagine that a voter can indeed be found who is willing to base his vote on the platforms of the political parties. He could then make use of the comparison published at the end of last year by the Federation of Dutch Labor Unions [FNV]. This would not be of much help. For the FNV, it is less



a matter of a comparison than of recommended voting. It is true that in the publication this is denied in so many words, but the fact that it constitutes recommended voting is seen most clearly in the margin notes made by the FNV in comparing platforms. First of all, it notes that a preference by the CDA for a coalition with the VVD supposedly speaks strongly against the CDA. And secondly, the FNV says that it is not providing any judgement on the degree of reality of the platforms, only to belie this immediately by adding in one breath that the VVD platform does not tally.

Since last week, however, the voter who does want to base his vote on the electoral platforms has a better guide at his disposal, with its origins in the 1984 annual report of the Institute for Research and Government Expenditures (IOO). In this report, Drs Nico C. M. van Niekerk, the director of this institute and familiar to readers of ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD as a regular guest columnist, argues that independent experts should let their voices be heard in the "preliminary rounds" of this coming May's Second Chamber elections. He foresees organizing a "deliberating lobby" as a counterbalance to the pressure of interest groups. He has succeeded in doing just this: The editorial board of the publication put out by his institute, OPENBARE UITGAVEN, has heeded Van Niekerk's call by putting together, with the help of independent and specialist authors, a special issue in which the electoral platforms of the three largest parties are compared and carefully examined on the basis of their financial and economic consequences, and in which the pros and cons are weighed.

The results are certainly not comforting. None of the three parties emerges favorably from this comparison. The PVDA is trying to hold on to the electoral gains that the opinion polls are promising it by avoiding serious retrenchment measures as much as possible. Insofar as cuts are inevitable, the PVDA wants to hit not the citizens, but the business world. Even with a sympathetic interpretation of the PVDA platform, it still clearly involves a gap of more than four billion guilders in financial terms. Moreover, the PVDA is promising more than it can deliver. Specifically, the coupling mechanisms cannot be made good without raising the collective tax burden--something the PVDA does not want to do--or by making more cuts than the PVDA platform indicates.

#### Straws

Similar problems are evident in the CDA platform. In financial terms, it clearly contains a gap of a little under four billion guilders, while the CDA as well cannot deliver everything that it is promising the voters. Specifically, it will either have to raise the collective tax burden or put limits on the reduction of the government budget deficit, or reduce the buying power of civil servants, workers whose salaries are dependent on government wages and recipients of government benefits.

Grabbing at straws concerning a reduction of the work week is not a solution for the PVDA or the CDA, in view of the necessary conditions that would have to be satisfied if a reduction of the work week is to have a favorable effect:



reduction in the work week does in fact in many cases lead to a reduction in the hours of operation.

--The rate of filling vacancies should remain high, but this rate has amounted to no more than one-quarter in the past few years.

--No new labor supply should be elicited. And yet, there are reasons to presume that families want to keep their income at the same level, whereby the supply of women on the labor market will rise more sharply than the work hours of men will fall.

These conditions are so strict and so unrealistic that a reduction in the work week does not appear to be a real solution. But even if it were so, it is still not to the benefit of the PVDA or of the CDA. Indeed, these parties want to leave any change in the work week to the labor and management organizations themselves. In the (unrealistic) case that a reduction of the work week does offer a solution, the ability to implement the platform of both the PVDA and the CDA is thus entirely dependent on the position of labor and management.

The picture is not very different for the VVD. In financial terms, its platform does appear to be balanced, but anything can be put down on paper. The necessary cuts are not concretely and systematically quantified, while it is doubtful whether it will be possible in the coming cabinet term to allow social benefits and contract wages to grow even further apart every year, irrespective of the desirability of such a policy. Moreover, the VVD platform is inconsistent. On the one hand, the VVD feels that the government should pull back, while on the other hand the same party wants the government to involve itself in a number of areas with greater intensity.

In addition, the process that the VVD followed in drawing up the platform is not in keeping with other proposals by this party. There has been strong insistence from the VVD concerning setting up a deliberating lobby. Only recently, the academic office of the VVD proposed establishing a "council of economic experts" which every year would make a responsible assessment of matters of importance to the national budget--such as the growth rate of national income--in order to then measure the budget proposed by the cabinet up against it.

However, Drs G. de Jong points out in OPENBARE UITGAVEN that there has long been a functioning Commission of Economic Experts within the Socio-Economic Council. The members of this commission are primarily selected on the basis of expertise and independence. Ultimately, a balanced composition is sought in the sense of representatives of the major political currents. De Jong poses the rhetorical question of whether even one of the six members of this commission was actively involved by his party in the drawing up of the financial plank of the electoral platform. If that had been the case, he said, the financial planks of the electoral platforms would have looked quite differently.

But De Jong also wonders what can really be expected of political parties in writing these financial planks, since they too know that there are scarcely any voters who are going to examine them closely. A political party is not a homogenous whole. On the contrary, there are all sorts of groups within political parties who promote specific interests, which threatens to lead to an accumulation of demands without a good setting of priorities.

For this reason, De Jong thinks that it is not at all self-evident that an electoral program contain a well-balanced financial plank. In the competition for votes, a political party does not, after all, always have an interest in this. If a deliberating lobby were to operate within a political party, it would run the risk of being looked upon as puritanical and being called more Catholic than the pope. Its purpose will be primarily to grimly upset illusions, whereby it will make few friends within the party establishment.

Thus, it is certainly no surprise that economic experts are consulted so little by their parties. It could very well be that deliberation takes place outside the parties, but then it is really too late: the platforms are already drawn up.

12271

CSO: 3614/83

ENERGY

DENMARK

INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT CONCERNED ABOUT PRICE EFFECT ON OIL SECTOR

Greenland Search Halted

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Mar 86 Sect III p 13

[Article by Henrik Lerche, Department Head, Price Waterhouse]

[Text] The recent drop in the price of crude oil and in the value of the dollar has caused a considerable change in the expectations our politicians had almost 4 years ago when they introduced the fossil-fuel tax.

When the legislation was proposed in 1982, then-Tax Minister Mogens Lykktoft explained that the goal of this law was to guarantee that society as a whole would receive a reasonable share of the oil and gas revenues. Since the price of these products was so high at that time, it was believed that oil and gas revenues would be much higher than revenues from other branches of industry, as related to the amount of capital invested.

The tax system that was implemented consists of a fossil-fuel tax that is a special tax over and above the usual corporate taxes and fees.

However, the political debate, which has been widely covered by the press, has concentrated too much on the fossil-fuel tax. It seems that many people do not understand, or do not want to understand, that the fossil-fuel tax is a surtax. For companies that recover oil and gas from the Danish section of the continental shelf, the fossil-fuel tax is only one of four systems of taxes and fees that provide revenues for Denmark. According to the government's conservative estimate, these revenues totaled about 1 billion kroner in 1985.

First of all, in addition to the fossil-fuel tax, there is the general corporate tax that has now been increased from 40 to 50 percent. DUC (Danish Underground Consortium) participants must pay this tax, like all other companies in this country.

Secondly, the state receives a royalty fee of 8.5 percent of the total value of the oil and gas that is recovered.

Thirdly, the state coffers also receive a pipeline fee for transporting the oil and gas. The pipeline fee is also based on the value of the oil and gas that are transported.

With regard to the corporate tax, the royalties, and the pipeline fee, the amount of these revenues is proportional to the value of the products that are recovered and transported. As a result, these taxes and fees are strongly affected by drops in the price of oil and the value of the dollar.

If it is assumed that the price of oil is \$26 per barrel, a price for which we can no longer hope, and that the dollar rate is 9 kroner, then the state would receive 750 million kroner in 1986 and 840 million kroner in 1987 in fees alone, according to the Energy Ministry.

At a price of \$16 per barrel and an unchanged dollar rate of 9 kroner, the fees would drop to 660 million kroner in 1986 and 490 million kroner in 1987.

If the bottom should drop out of the market, so to speak, so that the price dropped to \$10 per barrel and the dollar rate also dropped to 7 kroner, then the fees would be reduced to 600 million kroner in 1986 and only 200 million kroner in 1987. The sharp drop in 1987 results from a certain delay in payment of the fees, so that a drop early this year would have its full effect only in 1987.

Naturally, it must be feared that a drop in oil prices will have a long-term effect on drilling activities in the Danish sector. This is already happening for the Arco Oil Company in Jamesonland, Greenland. As we know, it is one goal of our energy policy for Denmark to become more self-sufficient. Thus, the goals of our energy policy and our balance of payments considerations coincide.

Employment considerations also make it desirable for us to continue our drilling activities. The offshore industry and a long series of related industries and subcontractors such as shipyards are highly dependent on the drilling activities.

These circumstances show that we must exercise great restraint with regard to taxing oil.

While Denmark as a whole benefits from a drop in oil prices, since we still must import energy products, this is not true of the oil industry. Eventually, it could have unforeseen consequences.

At the same time, reserves in the Arab countries are and will continue to be so great that these countries will play an important role for some time. They say that when the Arabs cough, the West catches a cold. One of the remedies could be a suitable system of taxes and fees that would promote the utilization of our oil and gas reserves.

The shortage of revenues collected by the government must be covered in other ways. One good way, which has now been proposed in Norway, would be to increase the energy tax at the consumer level to cover lost revenues from producers.

## Consortium To Increase Activity

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Mar 86 Sect III p 14

[Article by Jesper Elle]

[Text] The state-owned oil company DONG (Dansk Olie og Naturgas A/S) is now facing its greatest challenge to date. Its subsidiary DOPAS (Dansk Olie og Gasproduktion) is preparing to become active in oil and gas exploration in the North Sea. DOPAS will learn this trade during an initial phase and later take on the role of operator. Its teacher probably will be Norsk Hydro or Statoil.

This year, after playing the role of a relatively passive partner in oil and gas exploration in the Danish sector of the North Sea, the state-owned oil company Dansk Olie og Naturgas will take its first step toward a major new active role.

Through its subsidiary DOPAS, DONG will participate as a 50-percent partner in Dansk Operatorselskap (DANOP), along with 20 Danish firms that have joined to form Denerco, which comprises the other 50 percent.

In the negotiations with bidders in the second round of bidding for exploration in the North Sea, which is nearing its conclusion, political provisions have been made for reducing DONG's share in the consortia from 20 to 10 percent, provided that DANOP is included as an apprentice to the operator. The desire is for DANOP to participate offshore in two operatorships in the most lucrative areas of the so-called Central Trough of the North Sea. This means that DOPAS could obtain some of the most advanced people.

During the initial stage DOPAS will provide no funding until a strike is made. Denerco will comprise 10 percent of the consortia that include DANOP, but will pay only 5 percent until a strike is made.

Two companies that have submitted bids in the second round are willing to take on DANOP as a "operator's apprentice." They are the Norwegian state-owned company Statoil and Norsk Hydro, both of which have been through the same learning process.

The training to become an operator will be a great challenge to DANOP.

"We have spent some time examining how we can structure our organization and our big task in 1986 will be to evaluate what we should do at DOPAS once a strike is made. At that time, we will go from a passive role to an active role as a paying partner," director Hans Jorgen Rasmussen of DOPAS said.

## Extensive Knowledge Of Oil Exploration

Through the years, DONG has acquired extensive knowledge of oil and gas exploration, its engineering aspects in particular, and now has a much stronger position than it had at the beginning of the gas project in 1979.



"In several areas we still need to learn and receive help from foreign companies, but we will not be totally without knowledge when we enter into close cooperation with one of the foreign companies that will obtain concessions. We have practical experience from the thermal drilling in Ars, but we have never tried to drill into important structures such as an oil reserve."

"We intend to make a contribution that will lead to success. If building up a new operator in Denmark is to make any sense, it must be done with long-range goals," Hans Jorgen Rasmussen said.

If estimates of the probability of a strike hold true, then DANOP and, consequently, DOPAS will be part of a rather substantial oil and gas production.

"On the day that a strike is made, the economic aspect will become a heavy burden. We must be sure that we are able to participate professionally, so that DONG will be guaranteed substantial revenues," the DOPAS director said.

#### North Sea Production Record

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Mar 86 Sect III p 18

[Article by Jesper Elle]

[Text] The production of North Sea oil and gas increases from year to year. The 1985 record will be broken this year and in 1987 the production of oil will increase by 1 million tons. At that time, the production of North Sea energy will cover more than 35 percent of Denmark's total energy needs.

Oil and gas production in the Danish sector of the North Sea set a record in 1985 with 2.9 million tons of crude oil, but this is far from being the last record that will be set.

According to Maersk Olie og Gas, which handles the North Sea production for the Danish Underground Consortium, this record will be edged out this year, when production is expected to be about 3 million tons of crude oil. In addition, it is estimated that gas production will correspond to about 2 million tons of oil.

When production begins in the Dan F Field and others in 1987, oil production will increase to a new record of about 4.4 million tons. Together with a gas production corresponding to 2.4 million tons of oil, the production of North Sea oil in 1987 will cover about 65 percent of Denmark's oil consumption and more than 35 percent of Denmark's total energy needs.

#### Biggest Project

The expansion of Denmark's oldest oil field, the Dan Field, is DUC's largest single project this year. Construction in the Dan F Field began back in the early summer of 1985 when the Maersk Explorer drilling rig drilled nine production wells. Near the end of the year the Dan Earl began drilling production wells, of which there will be up to 12 at each of the two platforms in the field.

The modules for these platforms, as well as communications bridges, are under construction at Aalborg Vaerft and at Jorgen Bladt A/S. This material will be delivered during the spring.

The last drilling rig is under construction in Japan. When it is put into place in the Dan F Field, it will be assembled with a turnkey treatment plant and a housing unit constructed at Odense Stalskibsvaerft.

These facilities, which are the shipyard's biggest offshore order to date, are special in that as much as possible of the construction, equipping, and testing will be done on land. This will reduce much of the expensive final work that must be done offshore.

In connection with the expansion of the Dan Field, a 24-km oil pipeline has been constructed to the Gorm Field and a 35-km gas pipeline to the Tyra Field. In this way, the gas can be brought from the Dan Field to the Tyra Field, and then transported further to land.

Total investments in the Dan F project are expected to be about 4 billion kroner before production can begin in early 1987.

#### The Rolf Field

Expansion of the Rolf Field is another of DUC's major ongoing projects. Pipeline connections with Gorm were made as early as May 1985. A two-phase oil/gas pipeline will take the raw materials from Rolf for treatment on Gorm. In addition, a gas line will convey gas from the Gorm Field down to the production wells of the Rolf Field, in order to promote production.

The last phase of construction in the field will be to place a module in the field with firefighting and production equipment. This module is being manufactured at Aalborg Vaerft. This will serve as an unmanned satellite field to the Gorm Field.

Total investments in this project will be about 600 million kroner. Production during the first year is estimated to be 300 to 350 thousand tons of oil. A subsequent drop is expected in the following years.

#### Tyra And Roar


In addition to Dan F and the Rolf project, a project is underway in the Tyra Field, where production of the least valuable product, condensate, will be increased. This is being done to accelerate production and to recover the condensate, which otherwise would remain underground.

The extra module that will be placed in Tyra West and the work required to install it will cost between 300 and 400 million kroner. According to estimates, the increased production will begin in 1987.

In October 1985 DUC sent development plans for the Roar Field to the Energy Ministry. According to these plans, production would begin on 1 October 1989.

Experience from gas production in the Tyra Field will show whether or not it will be necessary to begin production in the Roar Field at a later date.

The Roar Field is planned as a satellite field to Tyra West. It will consist of a single unmanned platform with combined recovery and production facilities. Gas and condensate will be transported through a two-phase pipeline to Tyra West, where the raw materials will be processed. It is estimated that total investments in this field will be about 2.5 billion kroner.



The diagram shows the location of Danish oil fields in the North Sea.

9336

CSO: 3613/86

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

FINLAND

BRIEFS

USSR ENVIRONMENT STUDIES--Finland and the Soviet Union have agreed on a program of environmental protection for the remaining years this decade. At the time an agreement was concluded on a practical cooperation program for this and next year. The agreement on the programs was concluded at the first session of the Finnish-Soviet mixed commission on the protection of the environment in Moscow. The programs concentrate on research in the protection of the air from pollution, especially the measurement and prevention of sulphur and nitrogen discharges drifting across the borders, the protection of the Gulf of Finland as well as nature reserves and threatened species. The Finnish side proposed a study on whether it would be possible to set up a nature reserve on both sides of the border between the countries, at Kuhmo and Kostamus. The Soviet Union also offers Finland the possibility of participating in a study of the Baltic Sea on board a Soviet vessel. [Text] [Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 9 Apr 86 LD] /12624

CSO: 3617/95

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